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In this paper, I contend that there is no universal answer to
whether common law courts provide a valuable function as a back-
stop to agency regulation for setting standards of care within an
industry, with which a provider of goods or services must comply.1
Rather, the potential benefits of having courts as a backstop will
depend on particular characteristics of the market in which a pro-
ducer operates.  These include, among other things, efficiencies of
uniformity of production, the risks of uncertainty facing the pro-
ducer about the standard of care, the information reasonably availa-
ble prior to the producer’s commitment to market a product, and
the likely reaction of consumers to knowledge about the product if
they are fully informed of its risks.
Given this premise about the value of tort law as a regulatory
backstop, the crucial question becomes: Which institution is best
suited to decide, in the context of a particular regulatory action,
whether tort suits are preempted?  Here the choice is not only be-
tween agency and court, but also Congress, which can, if it chooses,
preclude state tort suits with respect to virtually any mass tort.  My
thesis is that agencies are the preferable institution for deciding
whether state tort law should be preempted by regulation and that
* Patricia A. Dore Professor of Administrative Law, Florida State University
College of Law.  Thanks to the Florida State University Foundation for supporting
this research.  Thanks also to Cathy Sharkey for inviting me to the symposium,
which motivated me to write this Article; the other participants at the symposium
for a great discussion that informed the final version; the faculty at the University
of Richmond Law School for feedback on a presentation of this Article; Beth
Burch and Brian Galle for insightful comments; and Jesse Unruh for assistance
with research for this Article.
1. This paper limits its consideration to regulation of consumer goods and
services which can threaten health and safety, which are the kinds of commercial
activity that generate the mass tort actions that have garnered the attention of the
public, regulators and scholars alike.
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therefore courts should recognize agencies’ authority to preempt
state law under general rulemaking authority granted by Congress.2
At the outset, I need to clarify the scope of this thesis.  I do not
address directly the question that has arisen of late in tort preemp-
tion cases—the role of agencies in determining whether a statute
itself preempts common law tort suits either directly or by occupy-
ing the regulatory field.  Others have thoughtfully written on this
question, addressing whether agency input is appropriate and, if so,
how best to structure that input in the context of interpreting po-
tentially preempting statutes.3  Instead, this paper addresses the is-
sue of agency preemption in the absence of statutory instruction.4
My proposal may seem radical because it unmoors preemption
from any reliance, whether actual or imagined, on a congressional
decision on this issue.  Those who value federalism for its own sake
might therefore find my proposal disconcerting as it facilitates pre-
emption by circumventing the checks of the legislative process.5  Of
2. I am not alone in having reached this conclusion.  Cathy Sharkey recently
advocated a similar switch in focus from Congress to agencies for preemption deci-
sions. See Catherine Sharkey, Federalism Accountability: “Agency-Forcing” Measures, 58
DUKE L.J. 2125, 2129 (2009) [hereinafter Sharkey, Federalism Accountability]. See
generally William W. Buzbee, Preemption Hard Look Review: Regulatory Interaction, and
the Quest for Stewardship and Intergenerational Equity, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1521
(2009) (accepting that agencies can preempt state law but arguing that such action
should be subject to hard look review).
3. See generally Nina A. Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption, 102 MICH. L. REV.
737 (2004). See also Catherine M. Sharkey, Products Liability Preemption: An Institu-
tional Approach, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 449, 491–502 (2008) [hereinafter Sharkey,
Products Liability Preemption]; Thomas Merrill, Preemption and Institutional Choice, 102
NW. U. L. REV. 727, 769–79 (2008) [hereinafter Merrill, Preemption]; cf. Gillian E.
Metzger, Administrative Law as the New Federalism, 57 DUKE L.J. 2023, 2069–72
(2008) (discussing the role of ordinary doctrines of administrative law as a means
of implementing federalism concerns in preemption cases).
4. My conclusion that agencies should have primary responsibility for decid-
ing when tort suits are preempted does bear on the question of whether a statute
calls for preemption.  In order to preserve room for the agency to exercise this
responsibility, I conclude that courts should not interpret statutes definitively ei-
ther to preempt or to save tort suits except when the statute so provides explicitly
and clearly. See discussion infra Section IIIA.
5. See William N. Eskridge, Vetogates, Chevron, Preemption, 83 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1441, 1470 (2007) (opining that because agency rulemaking circumvents the
vetogates involved in the legislative process, “the Court should require a targeted
(preemption-specific) statement from Congress when it is delegating preemptive
authority to an agency”); Merrill, Preemption, supra note 3, at 750–51 (2008).
Those concerned with circumvention of the limits on preemption often call for
“presumptions against preemption” or “clear statement rules.” See Bradford R.
Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1321, 1425
(2001); Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Against Preemption: How Federalism Can Improve the
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course, courts ultimately rejected that concern with respect to
rulemaking in general, allowing broad delegations by Congress.6  If
one values federalism instrumentally, rather than as an end in itself,
the same arguments for allowing the regulatory process to be more
flexible than the legislative process also support allowing such flexi-
bility for preemption decisions.7  Even unabashed federalists might
take heart, however, because my proposal reduces the pressure on
courts to find statutory preemption on the slimmest of interpretive
reeds8 and imposes significant procedural and substantive burdens
before an agency could preempt tort law.  The hope is that this





Agencies can act in a variety of ways to establish regulation.  If
authorized by Congress they can adopt rules that govern industry
National Legislative Process, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 17, 32–39 (2007); Earnest A. Young,
Federal Preemption and State Autonomy, in FEDERAL PREEMPTION: STATE’S POWERS, NA-
TIONAL INTERESTS 249, 254 267–68 (Richard A. Epstein & Michael S. Greve eds.,
2007).  Such doctrines are examples of “resistance norms”—rules that discourage
particular government action by raising the cost of that action. See Ernest A.
Young, Constitutional Avoidance, Resistance Norms, and the Preservation of Judicial Re-
view, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1549, 1585 (2000).
6. See Heidi Kitrosser, The Accountable Executive, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1741, 1756
(2009) (stating that “the Court has come to accept broad policymaking delega-
tions from Congress to the administrative state”).
7. For some, like Brad Clark and Cass Sunstein, the non-delegation doctrine
remains vital in theory, foundering only in the lack of administrability of a distinc-
tion between enacting and executing the law. See Clark, supra note 5, at 1374; Cass
R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 338 (2000).  For them,
the canon requiring a statutory clear statement of intent to preempt state law
would reflect a limit on Congress’s authority to delegate preemption power to
agencies.  Hence, presumably they would find my proposal unconstitutional.  For
those who take the more usual view that Congress can delegate legislative func-
tions to agencies as long as it does so with sufficient safeguards, duly adopted regu-
lations are laws enacted pursuant to the Constitution and hence can preempt state
law under the Supremacy Clause.
8. See Catherine M. Sharkey, What Riegel Portends for FDA Preemption of State
Law Products Liability Claims, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 437, 438–41 (2009) [hereinafter
Sharkey, What Riegel Portends] (criticizing the Supreme Court Justices’ approaches
to interpreting preemption provisions as removed from analysis of statutory text,
and perhaps outcome driven).
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conduct.9  Some agencies are also charged with the responsibility to
approve products before they come on the market.10  Approval is
often based on imprecise standards set by statute or regulation, with
the agency filling gaps in the standards on a case-by-case basis11 or
by interpretive rule or policy statement.12  At times agencies regu-
late ex post by monitoring industry conduct and ordering a regu-
lated entity to cease and desist from conduct that the agency
determines to be contrary to statutory or regulatory standards.13
Regardless of how an agency sets initial standards, it usually has sig-
nificant enforcement discretion that allows it to refrain from penal-
izing an entity that has transgressed an agency standard.  To the
extent enforcement discretion is exercised in accordance with pre-
dictable criteria, it modifies any regulatory standard because those
criteria define the conduct that will trigger a regulatory response.14
Tort suits, like agency regulatory action, come in a variety of
forms and can develop in a variety of manners.  Some suits result
from isolated events that cause the conduct of one person to harm
9. See 1 RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 6.2, at 306 (4th
ed. 2002).
10. The FDA (Food and Drug Administration) has recently been highlighted
as an agency with such authority in several recent Supreme Court preemption de-
cisions. See Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 322–23 (2008); Desiano v.
Warner-Lambert & Co., 467 F.3d 85, 87 (2d Cir. 2006), aff’d per curiam Warner-
Lambert & Co. v. Kent, 552 U.S. 440 (2008) (evenly divided court); Wyeth v. Le-
vine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1195 (2009); see also Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act,
21 U.S.C. §§ 301–99 (2006).
11. See SEC v. Chenery, 332 U.S. 194, 201–03 (1947) (approving SEC author-
ity to establish policy by adjudication as well as rulemaking).
12. See Peter L. Strauss, Publication Rules in the Rulemaking Spectrum: Assuring
Proper Respect for an Essential Element, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 803, 808 (2001) [hereinafter
Strauss, Publication Rules].  The extent to which interpretive rules and statements
of policy have “legal effect” is controversial, although it is clear that they do not
have the same binding force of law of legislative rules. See Robert A. Anthony,
Interpretive Rules, Policy Statements, Guidances, Manuals, And The Like—Should Federal
Agencies Use Them to Bind the Public?, 41 DUKE L.J. 1311, 1315 (1992).
13. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (2006) (authorizing the Federal Trade Com-
mission to order a company to cease and desist from unfair trade practices).
14. See Jeannette L. Austin, Comment, The Rise of Citizen-Suit Enforcement in
Environmental Law: Reconciling Private and Public Attorneys General, 81 NW. U. L. REV.
220, 234–35 (1987) (articulating a sophisticated view of administrative law in
which “[e]nforcement efforts . . . are an integral part of the policymaking pro-
cess”); cf. Matthew C. Stephenson, Public Regulation Of Private Enforcement: The Case
for Expanding the Role of Administrative Agencies, 91 VA. L. REV. 93, 116 (2005) (not-
ing that agencies often adopt overly broad regulations and use enforcement discre-
tion to tailor them to optimize the social goals of the agency’s regulatory
program).
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another in a manner that is unique to their precise interaction;15
others may involve isolated incidents that injure numerous peo-
ple.16  Of late, tort suits that have generated the most controversy
about preemptive regulation have been products liability cases—
based on injuries, either realized or latent, caused by the use of a
product which may be a good or a service.17  Injuries in such cases
are traceable to similar causes and threaten similar potential inju-
ries to each victim.18
Along another dimension, tort suits can go to trial where a jury
ultimately may decide whether the injurers’ conduct was unreason-
able, thereby establishing the standard of care to the extent the
case provides controlling or persuasive precedent.19  Alternatively,
suits can settle, in which case the attorneys play a more significant
role in determining what conduct is reasonable and the cost the
defendant bears for its actions.20  To be sure, the strength of the
attorneys’ positions will depend on their predictions of how a jury is
15. These correspond to typical tort suits, like automobile accidents. See By-
ron G. Stier, Resolving the Class Action Crisis: Mass Tort Litigation as Network, 2005
UTAH L. REV. 863, 932–33 (distinguishing the typical tort involving an automobile
accident from mass tort cases).
16. See, e.g., Arce v. Burrow, 958 S.W.2d 239, 243 (Tex. App. 1997) (stating
that the case involved a plant explosion killing 23 people and injuring hundreds),
aff’d in part, rev’d in part, Burrow v. Arce, 997 S.W.2d 229 (Tex. 1999) (remanded
to trial court for determination of the existence of damages).
17. The Supreme Court has decided ten products liability preemption cases
since 1992: Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009); Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552
U.S. 312 (2008); Warner-Lambert & Co. v. Kent, 552 U.S. 440 (2008); Bates v. Dow
Agrosciences LLC., 544 U.S. 431 (2005); Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51
(2002); Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341 (2001); Geier v. Am.
Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000); Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470
(1996); Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280 (1995); Cipollone v. Liggett
Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
18. For a description of the various types of mass tort suits, see L. Elizabeth
Chamblee, Unsettling Efficiency: When Non-Class Aggregation of Mass Torts Creates Sec-
ond-Class Settlements, 65 LA. L. REV. 157, 164–70 (2004).
19. Cf. W. Kip Viscusi et al., Deterring Inefficient Pharmaceutical Litigation: An
Economic Rationale for the FDA Regulatory Compliance Defense, 24 SETON HALL L. REV.
1437, 1467–68 (“Application of broad liability rules and the application of 20-20
hindsight often places juries in the position of second guessing the FDA on the
types of warnings that should be provided with prescription drug products and
which products should be marketed.”).
20. See RICHARD A. NAGAREDA, MASS TORTS IN A WORLD OF SETTLEMENT 219–33
(2007) (describing how lawyers use the pathologies of settlement in class actions
strategically, and how that influences the resulting settlements); Guy Halfteck, Leg-
islative Threats, 61 STAN L. REV. 629, 643–45, nn.56–57 (2008) (describing the tradi-
tional view of litigation as regulation, which the author ultimately questions).
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likely to come out were the case to proceed to trial.21  In that sense,
the attorneys’ determination of reasonableness should track those
that would have been made by juries.  But there are a host of other
factors such as the cost of litigation facing each side, technical ques-
tions of procedure, and predictions about the extent of liability and
how the remedy will be allocated among plaintiffs, all of which bear
on the ultimate settlement of the matter.22
Judges also can considerably influence whether a product lia-
bility suit succeeds or fails, or more significantly in the context of
aggregated claims, whether it settles and on what terms.23  Judges
rule on outcome-determinative motions such as those for dismissal
for failure to state a claim or summary judgment.  These rulings
allow them direct input into determining the standard of care for
the defendant in a particular context.  Judges also decide whether
to certify a class, which greatly affects the potential liability threat
faced by the defendant and thereby influences the likelihood that
the defendant will settle.24
Also, the choice between agencies and courts arises in the con-
text where an agency has already acted, thereby setting some de-
fault standard of care.  The question then is whether to allow courts
to assess the reasonableness of industry conduct that has been ap-
proved by, or has complied with, the standards set by the relevant
agency.  When evaluating the institutional competence of the tort
system, I therefore assume that the courts will have the information
generated by the prior regulatory action.25  Regulators, however,
may or may not have information generated by tort suits depending
on whether such suits have been preempted, or whether the cases
have settled under agreements that restrict access to information.
Aside from these assumptions, it is important to understand that
21. See NAGAREDA, supra note 20, at 14–15 (noting that for a mass tort to de-
velop to a stage where defendants are apt to settle requires that plaintiffs’ attorneys
have a credible threat to prevail in individual cases).
22. See Roger C. Crampton, Individualized Justice, Mass Torts, and “Settlement
Class Actions”: An Introduction, 80 CORNELL. L. REV. 811, 822 (1995).
23. See NAGAREDA, supra note 20, at 7 (stating that the prospect of settlement
turns judges “from neutral umpires at trial to ‘managerial’ figures who oversee
deals and administer their implementation over time”).
24. See Robert G. Bone, Securing the Normative Foundations of Litigation Reform,
86 B.U. L. REV. 1155, 1169 (2006).
25. This may not be true if the information within the agency is deemed a
trade secret or otherwise within an exception to the Freedom of Information Act.
See Gardiner Harris, Drug Agency May Reveal More Data on Actions, N.Y. TIMES, June
2, 2009, at A10 (reporting on establishment of a task force to address FDA policy of
withholding drug safety information that drug manufacturers claim to be trade
secrets).
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regulations always provide a floor for the standard of care.  Al-
lowing tort suits leaves the ultimate regulatory standard to the com-
mon law process only for conduct above the regulatory floor.26
There are numerous potential benefits to authorizing agencies
to preempt by regulation.  As described below, they include: institu-
tional advantages of agencies in setting an efficient level of care;
reduction in uncertainty that could otherwise discourage produc-
tion of useful products; national uniformity, which can reduce over-
all costs of production; prevention of states from cost exporting;
and transparency and political accountability.
A. Setting the Standard of Care
Regardless of the precise criteria one advocates for setting the
standard of care applicable to producers of goods and services, the
incremental costs and benefits will have a bearing on the optimal
level of care.  Under either a negligence or regulatory standard that
results in violators bearing significant costs, the standard of care
provides a strong economic signal of the level of care for a pro-
ducer.  If that standard is set at a point other than where the margi-
nal cost of care equals the marginal benefit from care—however
society chooses to evaluate those costs and benefits—then produc-
ers will face a strong economic incentive to invest in an inefficient
amount of care.27  Under a strict liability system, the producer inter-
nalizes both the costs and benefits of care.  Therefore, the incentive
it faces to invest in care will depend on the marginal cost versus the
liability that will be created by limiting care.  As such, the manufac-
turer’s level of diligence will depend on the regulator’s or jury’s
assessment of the compensable costs of accidents.28  There are rea-
sons to expect that agencies will provide more accurate signals to
manufacturers about their optimal level of care.  Agency staff mem-
bers come from professions that are often trained in matters relat-
ing to the industry they regulate.29  Juries, however, are not only
untrained but subject to biases that tend to overinflate the costs of
accidents and understate the costs of care.30
26. Richard A. Epstein & Michael S. Greve, Conclusion: Preemption Doctrine and
Its Limits, in FEDERAL PREEMPTION: STATES’ POWERS, NATIONAL INTERESTS 309, 311
(Richard A. Epstein & Michael S. Greve, eds., 2007).
27. A negligence standard, however, will be fairly insensitive to the accuracy
of the assessment of damages. See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW & ECO-
NOMICS 353–56 (5th ed. 2008); Josh Teitelbaum, A Unilateral Accident Model under
Ambiguity, 36 J. LEG. STUD. 431, 459–60 (2007).
28. See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 27, at 338–41.
29. See B. GUY PETERS, THE POLITICS OF BUREAUCRACY 96 (4th ed. 1995).
30. See infra notes 35–39 and accompanying text. R
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Agency staff members have knowledge and experience that
make them superior to juries in evaluating the harms likely to be
caused by provision of a product or service and the costs of forcing
entities to meet a particular level of care.  Agencies employ profes-
sionals specialized in predicting the effects of products, or byprod-
ucts of their use, at various points along the chain of causation.
These employees have no direct stake in the ultimate standard of
care that is adopted by rule.31  Moreover, they are capable of learn-
ing about a problem and reaching fairly accurate conclusions about
costs and benefits relatively quickly.32  The tort system, in contrast,
uses an adversarial process that has been criticized for allowing
hired guns to confuse even fairly accepted issues of scientific fact.33
Moreover, the tort system often sets the standard of care by looking
at how those other than the defendant have acted in similar situa-
tions, which sets up a feedback loop that can induce the establish-
ment of non-optimal standards.34
In addition, juries have been accused of caprice and bias in
placing dollar values on life and health.35  In part, this may stem
31. See Mark Seidenfeld, Why Agencies Act: A Reassessment of the Ossification Cri-
tique of Judicial Review, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 251, 268–81 (2009) [hereinafter
Seidenfeld, Why Agencies Act].
32. See Peter H. Schuck, Some Reflections on the Future of Mass Torts, 12 CONN.
INS. L.J. 505, 511–12 (2006).
33. See, e.g., JOSEPH SANDERS, BENDECTIN ON TRIAL: A STUDY OF MASS TORT
LITIGATION 110–15, 195–97 (1998); Susan Haack, What’s Wrong with Litigation-
Driven Science? An Essay in Legal Epistemology, 38 SETON HALL L. REV. 1053, 1054
(2008); cf. E. Donald Elliott, Toward Incentive Based Procedure: Three Approaches for
Regulating Scientific Evidence, 69 B.U. L. REV. 487, 489 (1989) (describing how
clinical ecologists’ testimony about causation of harm from exposure to minute
quantities of a wide range of chemicals has unduly influenced toxic tort litigation).
34. See James Gibson, Doctrinal Feedback and (Un)Reasonable Care, 94 VA. L. REV.
1641, 1653 (2008) (stating that “a legal standard that defers to custom can create
systemic departures from efficient behavior and then allow those departures to
infect custom”).
35. See Mark Geistfeld, Constitutional Tort Reform, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1093,
1106–07 (2005) (reporting that jury awards of pain and suffering are aptly criti-
cized as “subjective, unpredictable and substantial”); Lars Noah, Comfortably Numb:
Medicalizing (and Mitigating) Pain-And-Suffering Damages, 42 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM
431, 442–44 (2009). But cf. Deborah R. Hensler, Jurors in the Material World: Putting
Tort Verdicts in Their Social Context, 13 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 8, 27–28 (2008)
(noting that jury awards for physical injuries in products liability cases are not par-
ticularly large compared to salaries of corporate executives).  Without opining on
the propriety of huge compensation packages for corporate executives, the victims
of products liability most certainly would not have generated increases in social
wealth anywhere near the dollar values reported in Professor Hensler’s survey of
jury awards in product liability cases.
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from an offer-asking price conundrum.36  The tort system generally
seeks to compensate the victim to the extent that he is indifferent
between receiving damages and not having been injured by the de-
fendant’s conduct.37  This essentially requires that the plaintiff be
awarded damages equal to the amount of money he would require
to allow the defendant to injure him.38  But this may be a far
greater amount than the actual total wealth the individual would
ever generate even if he was never injured.  As such, it is as if each
healthy individual has a potentially infinite reservoir of value
greater than the earnings he will actually create by his labors.  Tor-
tious conduct depletes this reservoir and, accordingly, juries re-
quire tortfeasors to replenish it.39  But the actual money that is
awarded must come from somewhere.  This can put a significant
strain on society, particularly, on producers of products that create
risks of harm and must generate dollars to pay claims.  I do not
mean to imply that agencies act in an ideal manner when putting
an implicit value on safety when setting standards of care.40  Analy-
ses of the costs and benefits of regulation have revealed that there is
a wide disparity between the implicit value of a life under different
regulatory schemes and, under some schemes, these values may be
as high as the jury awards that capture the attention of critics of the
36. The offer-asking price is “the amount one would be willing to pay for
something given one’s existing wealth versus the amount one would be willing to
accept to give up something to another.”  Joseph William Singer, Normative Methods
for Lawyers, 56 UCLA L. REV. 899, 918 (2009).
37. See Heidi M. Hurd, Death to Rapists: A Comment on Kennedy v. Louisiana, 6
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 351, 362 (2008) (stating that in principle, tort law fixes dam-
ages at the point where the plaintiff would have been indifferent “between the
harm done to her and a given cash payment”).
38. See Jennifer Arlen, Note, An Economic Analysis of Tort Damages for Wrongful
Death, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1113, 1119–20, 1124 (1985) (noting the problems caused
by the asking-offer price differential in wrongful death cases).
39. The reservoir idea is similar to the quantum theory concept of the elec-
tron which finds that a vacuum is comprised of an infinite number of electrons
filling energy states up to a certain level that characterizes the vacuum.  When a
particle gets excited out of one of these base states, the result is the creation of an
electron/positron pair.  The theory works well, but essentially requires a renormal-
ization of the energy in the universe to subtract off the energy of the infinite num-
ber of particles in the base states. See P.A.M. DIRAC, THE PRINCIPLES OF QUANTUM
MECHANICS 273–75, 295–96 (4th ed. 1958).  The jury when awarding damages es-
sentially never fully subtracts off the virtually infinite wealth each individual enjoys
simply by living in a healthy state.
40. See STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CYCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK
REGULATION 21 (1993) (noting that “agencies use different methods for estimating
the effects of their regulations”).
\\server05\productn\N\NYS\65-3\NYS309.txt unknown Seq: 10 18-MAR-10 13:52
620 NYU ANNUAL SURVEY OF AMERICAN LAW [Vol. 65:611
tort system.41  But, at least regulatory programs are not committed
to a compensation principle that assumes a level of personal wealth
that is inconsistent with the actual ability of individuals to generate
wealth.
Another problem that plagues the tort system is the fact that
once liability is imposed, the damage award often fails to take into
account harms that would occur even if the defendant never put
the product or service on the market.  For example, suppose a
plaintiff is suffering from shock and is prescribed a drug to main-
tain his blood pressure at a level that reduces his risk of dying from
the shock.  Suppose further that the manufacturer knows and does
not reveal that some individuals overreact to the drug and risk vas-
cular constriction that might threaten some of their extremities.  It
turns out that the plaintiff is one of those individuals, and the drug
causes him to lose the last digit of one of his fingers.  He sues,
claiming that the drug company was negligent in failing to warn of
the potential hazards of the drug.  He may win his suit, in which
case he would receive damages equal to the amount a jury deter-
mines sufficient to compensate him for the loss of his fingertip.42  It
may well be, however, that without the drug, he would have died,
but the tort system does not subtract from its damage award the
value the drug provided by increasing the chance of his survival.  In
contrast, an agency evaluating the costs and benefits of the drug
will explicitly consider the value of lives it is expected to save.43
One might counter that the market implicitly takes the value of
the drug into account.  If there is no equivalent drug without the
41. See id. at 22 (reporting that the value that regulators implicitly attach to a
statistical life vary from about $100,000 to $125 million). But see CASS R. SUNSTEIN,
THE COST-BENEFIT STATE: THE FUTURE OF REGULATORY PROTECTION 77 (2002) (re-
porting that agencies’ explicit valuation of a life, used in CBA’s required for major
rules varies from $1.5 to $6.1 million).  The difference between these figures may
reflect that agency programs that save lives provide other benefits as well, so that a
simple comparison of the cost of the program to lives saved may not represent an
agency’s valuation of a life saved.
42. Essentially, the problem is the converse of the controversy surrounding
the “lost chance” tort doctrine.  Under that doctrine, a tortfeasor pays the full cost
of injury even though it only increased the probability that the injury would occur.
See Todd S. Aagaard, Note, Identifying And Valuing the Injury in Lost Chance Cases, 96
MICH. L. REV. 1335, 1351 (1998).  The problem I identify results from the
tortfeasor’s conduct being charged with all the harm it causes but not being
credited with benefits it bestows.
43. See Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62
U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 77 (1995) (reporting that the FDA calculated benefits from
drugs it evaluated by using a range between $1.5 to $3.0 million per life the drug
was anticipated to save).
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same potential side effects, and the tort system holds the manufac-
turer liable, then the manufacturer should be able to price the drug
to cover the negative costs of the injuries it causes because of the
great positive value it provides to its users.  But markets do not work
perfectly and consumers are not always rational, especially when it
comes to actions to which they attribute subsequent harm.44  First,
consumers usually will not have sufficient information to determine
the value of a product that helps prevent injuries or diseases.  Sec-
ond, as I just discussed, damage awards reflect an asking price that
is above the price consumers are willing to offer for added safety
and may reflect a premium for insurance that consumers do not
wish to purchase.45  Thus, profits from sales of a product or service
may not cover tort liability even if its availability increases social
wealth.  Third, a manufacturer may decide not to continue produc-
ing a product even if it provides net benefits to society because con-
sumers often overreact to fears of potential harm from a product,
especially when that harm has been publicized due to a high profile
tort suit.46  This is of special concern when a tort claim is based on a
manufacturer’s failure to warn adequately about risks created by a
product.47  Jurors presented with the facts of a particular case are
apt to focus on whether the warning was sufficient to discourage
use by a person for whom risk from the product was great.  Jurors
are unlikely to consider situations not before them, such as when
the warning might have discouraged use by a person who would
have benefited from the product.  Unlike juries, regulators know to
44. See, e.g., Ilana Ritov & Jonathon Baron, Reluctance to Vaccinate: Omission
Bias and Ambiguity, 3 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 263, 275 (1990) (reporting that
parents say they would not vaccinate their children against an imminent epidemic
because of a risk that the vaccine might kill their children, even if the risk of death
from the vaccine is less than from the disease).
45. Thus, critics of products liability note that such liability essentially forces
users of a product to pay for insurance that compensates for pain and suffering
and other non-pecuniary harms that people rationally do not insure against. See
Robert Cooter, Towards a Market in Unmatured Tort Claims, 75 VA. L. REV. 383,
391–92 (1989); George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law,
96 YALE L.J. 1521, 1547, 1553 (1987).
46. Although peer-reviewed analyses of the morning sickness drug Bendectin
found the drug to be effective and no evidence that the drug increases the risk of
birth defects, its manufacturer took the drug off the market in response to the
outcome of tort suits. See SANDERS, supra note 33, at 19–20, 61.
47. See W. KIP VISCUSI & WESLEY A. MAGAT, LEARNING ABOUT RISK: CONSUMER
AND WORKER RESPONSES TO HAZARD INFORMATION 96 (1987); Daniel Kahneman &
Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA
263, 263–73 (1979) (discussing how consumers overweigh the risks of losses); W.
Kip Viscusi & Richard J. Zeckhauser, Hazard Communication: Warnings and Risk, 545
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 106, 111 (1996).
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assess all the costs of a warning, including the likelihood that warn-
ings may discourage use that would provide net benefits.48  Thus,
regulators can modify the warning to minimize this problem.
Fourth, for some products such as vaccines against easily transmit-
ted diseases that do not work perfectly, there is an external public
benefit provided by each individual who gets vaccinated.  The more
people who get vaccinated, the less likely everyone is to be exposed
to the disease and therefore to contract the disease if the vaccine
happens not to be effective for them.  In that situation, the tort
system and the market may drive the vaccine maker out of business
even though the vaccine provides significant net benefits to society.
The over-deterrence that may be caused when tort actions are
filed in response to alleged injury may be counter-balanced by the
likelihood that in many situations in which producers may fail to
take reasonable care, they will still escape suit.  A person injured by
a product may have to expend significant resources to learn that
the producer failed to take adequate care or that use of the product
likely caused him injury.49  There are also costs to bringing suit
even once the victim learns this information.50  Such transaction
costs pose less of a barrier if victims can band together to sue.  Re-
cent changes to federal law, however, may have significantly in-
creased the difficulty of getting a national product liability class
action certified.51  Moreover, for some mass tort claims, coordinat-
48. See, e.g., Brief for the United States as Amici Curiae Supporting Defen-
dant-Appellee and Cross-Appellant, Motus v. Pfizer, Inc., 358 F.3d 659 (9th Cir.
2001) (Nos. 02-55372, 02-55498, at 23–24) (making the FDA’s argument for pre-
emption—that a stronger warning on the drug Zoloft would be non-optimal be-
cause it would unreasonably discourage use).
49. See infra note 50.
50. See Jeremy D. Fraiberg & Michael J. Trebilcock, Risk Regulation: Techno-
cratic and Democratic Tools for Regulatory Reform, 43 MCGILL L.J. 835, 840 (1998).  For
a detailed discussion of the impediments to litigation, see DON DEWEES, DAVID
DUFF & MICHAEL TREBILCOCK, EXPLORING THE DOMAIN OF ACCIDENT LAW: TAKING
THE FACTS SERIOUSLY (1996).
51. The Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA) generally allows removal to federal
court of certain class claims with minimal diversity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2)
(2006) (granting original jurisdiction to federal courts for certain class actions
with minimal diversity and more than $5 million in controversy).  Any significant
national class action will therefore be removable to federal court.  CAFA, however,
did not alter the preexisting choice of law regime, which leads to the potential that
individual plaintiffs’ claims may be governed by the law in the state in which the
injury or transaction occurred.  This effectively means that the law will differ for
plaintiffs from different states, which in turn may render the class action unman-
ageable. See Byron G. Stier, Resolving the Class Action Crisis: Mass Tort Litigation as
Network, 2005 UTAH L. REV 863, 883–89 (2005).  For a discussion of the possible
effects of CAFA on choice of law in class actions, see generally Samuel Issacharoff,
\\server05\productn\N\NYS\65-3\NYS309.txt unknown Seq: 13 18-MAR-10 13:52
2010] WHO DECIDES WHO DECIDES 623
ing the trial of numerous independent cases may prove prohibi-
tively burdensome.52
If in fact the difficulties of bringing tort actions discourage
them except when a producer engages in a blatant dereliction of
the duty to exercise care, then there is little detriment to allowing
tort suits as a backup to regulation.  Torts suits will then only be
brought in those cases where regulation proves to have grossly mis-
specified the standard of care.  This is precisely when such suits will
have a salutary effect.  It may be, however, that the ability of a law-
yer to overcome the barriers to mass tort actions will depend not
only on the egregiousness of the defendant’s conduct, but also on
such factors as the saliency of the injuries, the extent to which easily
obtained data from the regulatory agency shows a causal connec-
tion between use of the product and injury—even if such use still
does not explain most of the injuries—and the extent to which the
producer has an interest in keeping aspects of its conduct secret.
The problem with the under-deterrence argument is that once a
lawyer can credibly threaten class certification or a multitude of in-
dependent suits in which the issue of liability poses identical factual
issues, he will be better able to persuade the producer to settle,
usually for more than the expected value that would result from
going to trial.53  A priori, it is not clear how strongly failure of regu-
lation to prevent grossly inadequate care by a producer will corre-
late with a credible threat of a potentially ruinous tort suit.  In
short, whether allowing torts as a backup to regulation will benefi-
cially influence the conduct of producers depends on the precise
regulation at issue and the conduct it means to induce.
B. Certainty
Producers prefer certainty for at least two reasons: first, they
are risk averse, and second, they seek to protect reliance interests.
Regulations by themselves tend to serve both interests well.  Once a
regulation is adopted it remains the binding standard of conduct
until it is repealed or amended by the agency or overridden by stat-
Settled Expectations in a World of Unsettled Law: Choice of Law After the Class Action
Fairness Act, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1839 (2006).
52. See Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Litigating Groups, 61 ALA. L. REV. 1, 16
(2009) (noting the problems of “disunity” that plaintiffs face in organizing aggre-
gate non-class action litigation).
53. The potential for plaintiffs’ attorneys to extract greater value than the
expected value from trial results from the different strategic interests of plaintiffs
and defense lawyers with respect to the risk of going to trial.  Chris Guthrie, Fram-
ing Frivolous Litigation: A Psychological Theory, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 163, 169 (2000).
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ute.  For matters in which producers have significant reliance inter-
ests, it is likely to take several years for an agency to amend or
repeal a regulation.54  Agencies can react by amending rules more
quickly, however, when post-adoption events clearly demonstrate
that a regulation is counterproductive.55  Sometimes regulations
are far from pellucid and agencies give meaning to them by subse-
quent interpretation or application.56  Interpretations issued
outside of agency adjudications can be adopted without prior no-
tice and procedure.57  Once adopted, however, they only apply pro-
spectively.58  An agency can fill in the meaning of a regulation by
applying it to a particular set of facts in an adjudication, but will be
unable to impose liability or fines on a regulated entity unless that
entity was on notice at least that the rule could reasonably be read
to prohibit the conduct in which it engaged.59  The worst case sce-
nario for regulatory interference with reliance interests occurs
when a producer invests significant resources in developing a prod-
uct it thinks will meet regulatory standards, only to find after devel-
opment that an agency is unwilling to approve the product.60  This
threatens significant loss of investment, but still leads to a fairly cer-
54. Amendment or repeal requires that the agency go through a full rulemak-
ing proceeding, which for contested rules generally takes several years. See Corne-
lius M. Kerwin & Scott R. Furlong, Time and Rulemaking: An Empirical Test of Theory,
2 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 113, 134 (1992) (reporting an average of 3 years
from the time a rulemaking entered the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA)
regulatory development management system and time it was finally adopted).
55. See Michael Kolber, Rulemaking without Rules: An Empirical Study of Direct
Final Rulemaking, 72 ALB. L. REV. 79, 82–83 (2009) (describing how the FDA has
used “direct final rulemaking” to expedite the rulemaking process for some rules,
but also how the agency has improperly attempted to get controversial rules ap-
proved without meaningful comment using this approach).
56. See, e.g., Air Transp. Ass’n of Am. v. F.A.A., 291 F.3d 49, 53–54 (D.C. Cir.
2002) (clarifying that a regulation limiting maximum flight times for commercial
airline crew members required airlines to use expected flight times based on actual
conditions on the day of the flight rather than scheduled flight times).  Agency
interpretations of their own regulations enjoy great deference on judicial review.
See Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997); Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand
Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945) (“[T]he administrative interpretation . . . [is] of
controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the
regulation.”).
57. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (2006).
58. Such interpretations are rules under the APA, and hence apply prospec-
tively.  5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (2006).
59. See Epilepsy Found. of Ne. Ohio v. N.L.R.B., 268 F.3d 1095, 1102–03 (D.C.
Cir. 2001).
60. Often the preemption question arises when an agency has to approve a
product before it is sold, e.g., FDA approval of drugs.  But even after an agency
approves the product, the agency usually has authority to continue monitoring the
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tain outcome after the agency decision: If the product is approved
the producer can market it; if it is not approved, the producer can-
not market it.
Tort suits, in contrast, create significant potential to interfere
with reliance interests and to generate continuing uncertainty
about the costs a producer will incur.  The very nature of tort law
requires suit after the injury has occurred.  By necessity, it takes an
ex post perspective on the conduct at issue when assessing whether
it was reasonable.61  The availability of class actions and other
mechanisms for consolidating claims allows tort suits to be settled
en masse helping to create certainty of outcome after the alleged
injury occurs.62  Hence, even tort law may allow for considerable
future certainty.  But it does so well after the producer has made
significant investment in the product, and most importantly after
the producer has already sold the product, thereby incurring po-
tential liability.  Tort law’s potential disruption of reliance interests
occurs even if tort law is merely a backup to regulation.  Therefore,
without preemption, tort law can threaten to destroy much of the
certainty that regulation creates.
C. Uniformity and State Cost Exporting
Another concern of producers is the prospect of having to
comply with a multitude of conflicting state standards imposed by
the various state tort systems.  Faced with conflicting standards of
care, producers who wish to avoid liability have no choice but to
differentiate their products to meet the standards of each jurisdic-
tion or forbear from participating in some markets.63
This concern about state standards that actually conflict—stan-
dards such that compliance with one means non-compliance with
the other—does not arise in situations where the sole issue is how
much care to take rather than the precise form in which care must
product and to order the producer to cease marketing it if the agency finds that
the product fails to meet governing safety standards.
61. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Regulating in Foresight Versus Judging Liability in
Hindsight: The Case of Tobacco, 33 GA. L. REV. 813, 824 (1999).
62. See Samuel Issacharoff & Richard A. Nagareda, Class Settlements Under At-
tack, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1649, 1651 (2008).
63. Producers can choose to market their product and pay damages for the
violation of state tort standards. See Mary J. Davis, The Battle over Implied Preemption:
Products Liability and the FDA, 48 B.C. L. REV. 1089, 1138 (2007).  In many cases,
however, this is not feasible because the cost of the product will not be sufficient to
cover the liability plus the costs of resolving claims. See supra notes 35–39 and R
accompanying text.
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be exercised.64  Thus, the nature of the alleged violation of the duty
of care greatly affects whether uniformity is an issue.  In addition,
the costs of producing products that vary state by state will differ
depending on the product.  For example, the cost of modifying the
production lines for automobiles to meet standards of individual
states would seem, at least on first reflection, to be much greater
than the cost of labeling a drug to meet state by state differences
regarding warnings of side effects or dangers.
Nonetheless, even state-by-state standards that simply hinge on
the level of care create potential problems because manufacturers
can avoid the costs of non-uniformity only by producing products
that comply with the most stringent state standard.  This essentially
allows the tort system in a single state to set a national standard of
care.  Assuming that the standards set by the states vary around the
actual optimal level of care, the fact that the most stringent stan-
dard will prevail effectively results in an overly strict standard of
care.  This tendency toward strict tort standards is exacerbated by
the potential for juries to relate more to their “neighbor” plaintiffs
rather than to out-of-state commercial entities that defend the in-
juring product.65  Juries are unlikely to understand that imposing
liability will raise the cost of the product to all who use it and, in
extreme cases, might cause the producer to pull the product from
the market altogether.  Moreover, the fact that trial judges in many
states are elected could further magnify the over-regulation ten-
dency because judges may feel pressure to deliver verdicts in favor
of local citizens.66
64. If the issue is one of how stringent a standard is, then a manufacturer can
meet all standards by meeting the most stringent one.  Technically, the various
standards do not conflict.
65. See Laura G. Dooley, National Juries for National Cases: Preserving Citizen Par-
ticipation in Large-Scale Litigation, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 411, 437 (2008) (proposing a
national jury system to overcome local nature of local jury values). But cf. Edward
A. Purcell, Jr., The Class Action Fairness Act in Perspective: The Old and The New in
Federal Jurisdictional Reform, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1823, 1848 (2008) (“Except in the
most obvious and egregious cases, charges of ‘bias’ and ‘local prejudice’ were ex-
ceptionally difficult—if not impossible—to prove.”).
66. See RICHARD NEELY, THE PRODUCT LIABILITY MESS: HOW BUSINESS CAN BE
RESCUED FROM THE POLITICS OF STATE COURTS 62 (1988) (stating that where judges
are elected, “it should be obvious that the in-state local plaintiff, his witnesses, and
his friends, can all vote for the judge, while the out-of-state defendant can’t even
be relied upon to send a campaign contribution”); Alexander Tabarrok & Eric
Helland, Court Politics: The Political Economy of Tort Awards, 42 J.L. & ECON. 157,
158–59 (1999) (positing that voters will support judges who redistribute income to
in-state plaintiffs from out-of-state defendants); id. at 186 (reporting strong empiri-
cal evidence that where judges are elected awards against out-of-state plaintiffs are
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D. Transparency
The transparency of agency standard setting depends on
whether the agency proceeds by rulemaking, adjudication or simply
by ad hoc enforcement policy.  Agency rulemaking is fairly trans-
parent.  An agency generally must use notice-and-comment
rulemaking to adopt, amend or repeal a legislative rule.67  Critics of
administrative government have objected that the agency often is
committed to the basic framework of a rule even before it publishes
the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NOPR) that triggers the no-
tice-and-comment process.68  Current executive orders, however,
require agencies to file regulatory plans that reveal intentions to
adopt rules to address particular problems well in advance of the
actual development of proposed rules.69  Also, the structure of an
agency rulemaking team helps ensure that groups with an interest
in the subject of the rulemaking are informed about and provide
input into the NOPR.70  The transparency of the rulemaking pro-
cess is further enhanced by judicially imposed requirements that an
agency reveal in the NOPR any information on which it relies in
developing the rulemaking proposal.71  Ultimately, judicial review
requires the agency to explain how it reached its decision to adopt
a rule given relevant statutory provisions and data.72
Outside of the notice-and-comment rulemaking paradigm,
transparency of agency standard setting declines, potentially precip-
itously.  Standards that are announced in agency guidance docu-
much higher than those against in-state plaintiffs).  It is informative that even
Tabarrok and Helland fail to mention that the bias against out of state producers
imposes costs on in state users of products. Cf. Saul Levmore, Interstate Exploitation
and Judicial Intervention, 69 VA. L. REV. 563, 570–73 (1983) (distinguishing between
state exploitation of other states, which create inefficiencies by exporting costs to
other states, and state interferences with activities in other states, which may create
inefficiencies, but do so at least partially at the expense of the adopting state).
67. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2006).
68. See Stephanie Stern, Cognitive Consistency: Theory Maintenance and Adminis-
trative Rulemaking, 63 U. PITT. L. REV. 589, 600 (2002) (presenting evidence of
agency “lock-in” to a rule once it is proposed).
69. Exec. Order. No. 12,866, § 4(c), 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993).
70. See Brian Galle & Mark Seidenfeld, Administrative Law’s Federalism: Preemp-
tion, Delegation, and Agencies at the Edge of Federal Power, 57 DUKE L.J. 1933, 1956–57
(2008) [hereinafter Galle & Seidenfeld, Administrative Law’s Federalism].
71. See Portland Cement Ass’n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 392–93 (D.C.
Cir. 1973); Engine Mfrs. Ass’n v. EPA, 20 F.3d 1177, 1181 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Am.
Med. Ass’n v. Reno, 57 F.3d 1129, 1132–33 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
72. See Mark Seidenfeld, Demystifying Deossification: Rethinking Recent Proposals to
Modify Judicial Review of Notice and Comment Rulemaking, 75 TEX. L. REV. 483, 491–92
(1997) [hereinafter Seidenfeld, Demystifying Deossification].
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ments must be published in the Federal Register if the agency is to
rely on them,73 which affords public notice before they are applied.
Such standards are not rules with the force of law, however, so
courts often find that these standards are not final agency action or
are unripe for review.74  Hence, standards often evade judicial re-
view that would force the agency to reveal the information on
which it relied in formulating them.  Standards that are created via
approval of specific products or enforcement actions are subject to
judicial review but may be sufficiently obscure to elude public no-
tice.  Such proceedings are also frequently handled by informal
procedures and therefore, unlike rulemaking, are less likely to be
subject to scrutiny by staff members who bring varying professional
perspectives.75
To the extent enforcement affects regulatory standards, the in-
formation and criteria underlying agency policy may be far from
clear.  Agency personnel may not apply enforcement criteria con-
sistently and the agency often does not reveal what drives decisions
not to prosecute a violation of a regulation or statute unless the
enforcement criteria are incorporated into a guidance document.76
Nor must an agency explain its decision to decline prosecuting an
individual violation because the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA) excepts such decisions from judicial review.77  Hence, en-
forcement policy is likely to be unknown and, even if known, not
explained by the agency.
At first blush, the tort system might appear more transparent
than agency regulation.  Trials are open to the public and tran-
scripts are generally public records.  Evidence is admitted in open
court so information from which liability stems is part of the open
record.  But few cases get to jury trial.78  Attorneys settle cases on
73. See 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006).
74. Stephen M. Johnson, Good Guidance, Good Grief!, 72 MO. L. REV. 695,
712–13 (2007).
75. Cf. Seidenfeld, Why Agencies Act, supra note 31, at 272, nn.69–70 (noting
that agency enforcement and application of regulations is more readily subject to
capture than rulemaking in part because of decreased monitoring of those activi-
ties by others in the agency).
76. An agency may incorporate criteria into a guidance document to inform
its own staff of its enforcement policies. See Strauss, Publication Rules, supra note
12, at 804–05.
77. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 837–38 (1985) (holding that deci-
sions not to prosecute an alleged regulatory violation are excepted from judicial
review by the APA because such decisions are committed to agency discretion by
law).
78. John Fabian Witt, Bureaucratic Legalism, American Style: Private Bureaucratic
Legalism and the Governance of the Tort System, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 261, 267–68 (2007).
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behalf of clients and part of getting the best settlement may include
sealing or even destroying information.79  Thus, the information
needed to evaluate the efficacy of standard setting done via the tort
system often is not public.  Even for cases that go to trial, juries do
not explain the reasoning underlying their verdicts.  Hence, while
the evidence admitted at trial may be available to the public, the
evidence on which the jurors actually relied to reach their verdict
remains uncertain.
E. Accountability
Although agency members are not directly elected, their rela-
tionship with the political branches provides significant democratic
accountability.80  The President has several mechanisms to assure
that he retains significant influence over agency policy.  First, and
probably foremost, he appoints agency heads and their assistants.81
Second, for many agencies, the President has plenary power to re-
move political appointees.82  Third, agencies need the President as
an ally if they are to succeed in the annual competition for appro-
priations for regulatory programs.83  More formally, the President
has issued several executive orders that have increased the authority
79. THOMAS O. MCGARITY & WENDY E. WAGNER, BENDING SCIENCE: HOW SPE-
CIAL INTERESTS CORRUPT PUBLIC HEALTH RESEARCH 121 (2008) (reporting that de-
fendants offer bonuses for settlements in which plaintiffs agree not to disclose
documents that may be damaging to the defendants).
80. Although judges are elected in many states, those who are generally get
elected by those in the region where they sit.  This has the potential to create
geographical bias in those judges who are elected.
81. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
82. Although Congress has significant leeway to restrict the President’s re-
moval power, see Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 694–96 (1988), it may not be
able to restrict, and to date has not restricted, the President’s power to remove the
heads of executive departments. See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114
HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2251 (2001) (distinguishing between Congress’s intent with
respect to Presidential control over independent and executive agencies).
83. See Thomas H. Hammond & Jack H. Knott, Who Controls the Bureaucracy?:
Presidential Power, Congressional Dominance, Legal Constraints, and Bureaucratic Auton-
omy in a Model of Multi-Institutional Policy-Making, 12 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 119, 124
(1996) (reporting that many studies support the theory that the President plays
“an agenda-setting role for congressional deliberations on agency appropria-
tions”); Terry M. Moe, Control and Feedback in Economic Regulation: The Case of the
NLRB, 79 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1094, 1101 (1985) (discussing the president’s influ-
ence over agencies through the use of such mechanisms as the appointment pro-
cess and the agency budget).
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of the White House to monitor agency policies to ensure that they
are consistent with the administration’s priorities.84
Despite the increase in presidential clout,85 Congress still re-
tains significant means of influencing agency policy.  For instance,
the Senate must approve appointments of principal officers of the
United States.86  Congress also controls funding and can influence
agencies directly by limiting the use of funds for programs it dis-
likes and indirectly by threatening to cut the overall budget of an
agency.87  Congress can also engage in oversight hearings that can
embarrass an agency head and in the process sway public opinion
against practices that Congress can spin as being inconsistent with
basic public expectations about the agency’s mandate.88
The courts too influence the administrative state by requiring
agencies to reveal the data underlying most of their regulatory ac-
tions, and to explain those actions.89  Additionally, the reasoned de-
cision-making requirement of the current standard for arbitrary
84. See Michael Hissam, The Impact Of Executive Order 13,422 on Presidential
Oversight of Agency Administration, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1292, 1293–1300 (2008).
President Obama recently reversed this trend, at least temporarily, by rescinding
President George W. Bush’s Executive Orders 13,258 and 13,422, returning the
formal channels for White House monitoring of agency rulemaking to those in
place under President Clinton. See Exec. Order No. 13,497, 74 Fed. Reg. 6113 (Jan
30, 2009).
85. See Kagan, supra note 82, at 2281–82 (detailing increased presidential in-
fluence on agency regulation in the Clinton White House); Yaniv Heled, On Presi-
dents, Agencies, and the Stem Cells Between Them: A Legal Analysis of President Bush’s and
the Federal Government’s Policy on the Funding of Research Involving Human Embryonic
Stem Cells, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 65 (2008) (describing President George W. Bush’s
promotion of his personal agenda regarding stem cell research).
86. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
87. See Galle & Seidenfeld, Administrative Law’s Federalism, supra note 70, at
1980 (noting Congress’s influence over agencies that derives from its appropria-
tions power).
88. See David W. Case, The EPA’s Environmental Stewardship Initiative: Attempting
to Revitalize a Floundering Regulatory Reform Agenda, 50 EMORY L.J. 1, 22–23 (2001)
(describing how congressional hearings undermined the perceived legitimacy of
Reagan’s EPA and forced him to appoint William Ruckelshaus to head the
agency); Geoffrey P. Miller, From Compromise to Confrontation: Separation of Powers in
the Reagan Era, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 401, 413–14 & n.79 (1989) (reporting on
congressional hearings of Secretary of the Interior James Watt and EPA head Anne
Gorsuch as attempts to get these agencies to take specific actions); David Johnston
& Neil A. Lewis, Senate Democrats Plan a Resolution on Gonzales, N.Y. TIMES, May 18,
2007, at A16 (discussing need for Attorney General Gonzales to resign in light of
information revealed and pressure put on Gonzales in Senate hearings about fir-
ing of United States Attorneys).
89. Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29,
49 (1983); Seidenfeld, Demystifying Deossification, supra note 72, at 498–99.
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and capricious review pragmatically forces agencies to include as
members of their rulemaking teams individuals from diverse profes-
sions who incorporate those perspectives into the regulatory
process.90
Although, in the federal system, courts are often viewed as the
least democratically accountable branch of government,91 there are
reasons to believe that they may provide some accountability for
standards of care set by tort suits.  Juries provide input from the
ordinary person and can therefore ensure basic consistency with
community norms.  Being drawn directly from the populace, they
also avoid undue interest group influence that can plague represen-
tative government and potentially, to a greater extent, administra-
tive agencies.  But juries are not chosen to be representative either
of the polity as a whole or of groups with interests at stake in the
battle to set regulatory standards.  Also, most states use some electo-
ral process for selection or retention of judges, who therefore pro-
vide some political accountability.92  Usually, however, they are
elected by those in the region where they sit,93 which can induce a
parochial bias, especially when a case involves a local individual
plaintiff injured by the product of a distant corporation.  By con-
trast, agencies answer most directly to the President, who is ac-
countable to the entire national polity.94
90. Some of the analysis required by statute and executive order for agency
rulemaking also demands that agencies include varying perspectives in the
rulemaking process.
91. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Role of Constitutional and Political Theory in
Administrative Law, 64 TEX. L. REV. 469, 506 (1985) (discussing the compelling
logic of describing the judiciary as the least politically accountable branch).
92. Herbert M. Kritzer, Law Is the Mere Continuation of Politics by Different Means:
American Judicial Selection in The Twenty-First Century, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 423, 431
(2007).
93. Mark C. Weber, Complex Litigation and the State Courts: Constitutional and
Practical Advantages of the State Forum Over the Federal Forum in Mass Tort Cases, 21
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 215, 227 (1994) (noting that state judges are elected from
their local districts, appellate judges and even sometimes supreme court justices
are usually elected from regions).
94. See Jerry L. Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should Make Political
Decisions, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 81, 95 (1985) (arguing that the relationship between
agencies and the President along with the President’s accountability to the na-
tional polity justifies delegating political decisions to agencies). See generally Peter
L. Strauss, Overseer, or “The Decider”? The President in Administrative Law, 75 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 696 (2007) (describing the debate about whether the President’s
authority allows him to substitute his decision for that of the agency to which Con-
gress delegated authority).  This does not mean that agencies are not capable of
acting contrary to the preferences of the national polity, but it does mean that as a
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The adversarial nature of the trial process also works to ex-
clude the voice of many who have an interest in the regulatory stan-
dard established by the tort system. By pitting injured users of a
product against the producer, the tort system fails to take into ac-
count others affected by the viability of the industry.  These in-
clude, most notably, non-injured users as well as diverse groups
such as employees and those who live near production facilities who
may benefit from economic activity generated by production.  In
addition, the pragmatic financial need for plaintiffs’ attorneys to
aggregate mass tort suits, along with defendants’ interest in resolv-
ing such suits once they mature sufficiently, creates a settlement





A. Compensation for a Moral Wrong
Although courts are not as knowledgeable as agencies about
balancing costs and benefits—the grist for setting standards of
care—tort claims have the advantage of providing compensation
for victims of injuries caused by a product.  The tort system, how-
ever, is not the only mechanism the state could use to provide com-
pensation.  For example, the state could provide a social insurance
scheme to compensate victims, funded by a general tax.  It could
adopt New Zealand’s system for accident compensation which
couples an insurance scheme with contributions tied to the number
and type of injuries a producer causes.96  Such systems use a sched-
ule of harms from injuries caused by covered conduct and, as such,
may not accurately capture the costs and benefits of a particular
course of conduct.  More significantly, implementing such a system
would require legislative action.  These systems, however, do not
placate the apparent desire of the public for a requirement that the
state make a finding whether the causation of harm by a producer
matter of institutional structure, they are not beholden to a geographically distinct
subset of the nation for their authority.
95. NAGAREDA, supra note 20, at 18–20.
96. See James C. Harris, Comment, Why the September 11th Victim Compensation
Fund Proves the Case for a New Zealand-Style Comprehensive Social Insurance Plan in the
United States, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 1367, 1373–76, 1389 n.161 (2006).
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was wrong and, if so, to impose the costs created by that wrong on
the producer.97
B. Incentives for Producers to Determine the Optimal Level of Care
The tort system also creates an incentive for producers them-
selves to determine the appropriate level of care.  The advantage of
the system is its ability to induce producers to make the cost-benefit
calculation, given that they will likely have better information than
either regulators or the courts about the costs and benefits of the
product.  This is especially important because increased knowledge
about product risks decreases costs of care.  Hence, ex ante deter-
minations of optimal care will be based on costs that are inflated
above current costs of care, and the further out one moves from the
date of approval, the less accurate the ex ante standard of care be-
comes.98  As I already indicated, there are reasons to believe that
the tort system imposes costs that are lower than the actual costs
caused by use of products, and other reasons to believe that it im-
poses costs that are too high.99  Even if the system is imperfect, how-
ever, it maintains an incentive for producers to continue learning
about injuries caused by their product and how to decrease the
costs of preventing those injuries—an incentive that would be elimi-
nated were producers certain not to face liability for marketing in
compliance with regulation.100
By internalizing the cost of injuries to the producer, the tort
system can make the producer a de facto insurer for these injuries:
If the product remains viable, despite the prospect of tort damage
awards, the producer can price the product to include the costs of
97. See Jules L. Coleman, The Practice of Corrective Justice, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 15,
28–29 (1995); Benjamin C. Zipursky, Rights, Wrongs, and Recourse in the Law of Torts,
51 VAND. L. REV. 1, 56 (1998).
98. See Michael G. Faure, Insurability of Damage Caused by Climate Change: A
Commentary 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1875, 1878 (2008) (noting that standards of care
must be allowed to change to reflect new technology); Steven Shavell, Liability and
the Incentive to Obtain Information About Risk, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 259, 259–60 (1992)
(contending that ex post liability for actions already taken give manufacturers an
incentive to obtain information about product risks); cf. David Rosenberg, Class
Actions for Mass Torts: Doing Individual Justice by Collective Means, 62 IND. L.J. 561,
575–79 (1987) (rebutting arguments that tort liability will deter investment in new
technology).
99. See supra notes 35–39 and accompanying text.  In addition to reasons why
the tort system may impose liability that is greater or less than the actual cost of
injuries, the system may impose costs in addition to direct liability to the extent it
generates notoriety about a product that causes users to avoid buying the product.
100. See Mary L. Lyndon, Tort Law and Technology, 12 YALE J. ON REG. 137,
166–67 (1995).
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harm, spreading the cost among all users.  In addition, through the
doctrine of comparative fault, the tort system can reduce moral haz-
ard problems.101
In some instances, however, the insurance scheme set up by
the tort system may not be ideal.  Most obviously, requiring the fil-
ing of a tort suit to get compensation is administratively expensive.
In addition, the class of individuals who pay for the insurance may
not be that which society would prefer as a matter of social justice.
The insurance scheme spreads the cost among all product users,
thereby alleviating the burden on the unlucky losers who are in-
jured by the product.  But the product users may already be the
unlucky members of society who, through no fault of their own, are
forced to use the potentially injurious product.  In such a situation,
it may be most fair to have the public bear the cost of injuries from
product use.  For example, consider expensive drugs used to keep
those with a serious illness alive.  The users of the drug are most
likely already burdened by their illness, and the costs of insuring
against a bad reaction to the drug would just be a further weight
imposed on those unfortunate to be ill.  Finally, the tort system may
spread risks among product users who prefer not to pay for insur-
ance for some injuries.102
C. Information Production and Monitoring
Use of a product provides information about problems with
the product that facilitate development of improvements or substi-
tutes.  Agency regulation is structured to provide incentives to de-
velop information about product safety prior to the decision setting
a safety standard or approving sale of the product.  The threat of a
tough standard or refusal to approve a product provides a signifi-
cant incentive for producers to cooperate with regulators to provide
information relevant to the initial regulatory decision.  Once the
agency makes its initial decision, however, a producer’s incentive to
cooperate is decreased.  Agencies have limited resources and usu-
101. See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 27, at 345–46 (noting that under assump-
tions of perfect compensation and standards set at optimal levels, all forms of neg-
ligence result in incentives to both injurer and victim for efficient precaution);
John A. E. Pottow, Private Liability for Reckless Consumer Lending, 1 U. ILL. L. REV.
405, 458–59 (2007) (addressing comparative fault in the context of contract law,
but illustrating how comparative fault may reduce the risks of moral fault); see also
Tom Baker, On the Genealogy of Moral Hazard, 75 TEX. L. REV. 237, 273 (1996).
102. For example, as previously noted, people do not purchase insurance for
pain and suffering from injuries. See supra note 45.
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ally a significant backlog of other matters needing attention.103
Staff members garner recognition for getting standards adopted or
drugs approved, not for revisiting actions already taken.104  Hence,
an agency has little incentive either at the institutional or individual
level to revisit an issue it has already resolved.105  As a corollary, an
agency therefore has little interest in continuing to develop or
monitor information about product safety once it has taken its ini-
tial regulatory action.  The prospect of large awards can motivate
plaintiffs and their attorneys to discover information about the risks
of harm posed by a product that an agency might not have the abil-
ity or incentive to uncover.106  Regulatory preemption, however,
threatens to cut off discovery as an avenue for development of in-
formation that might bear on the proper standard of care.
D. Public Awareness of a Potential Problem with a Product
Tort suits for significant damages tend to generate greater pub-
licity than all but the most salient regulatory actions.  Media reports
on large awards can heighten public awareness of the benefits and
harms created by a product.107  Public interest entrepreneurs can
use the media reports to help organize members of the public to
weigh in on whether a producer has acted improperly by continu-
ing to market a product that threatens injury to users.108  Even if
the jury or judge is not representative of the public, the process of
soliciting public reaction to tort suits and popular support for hold-
103. Thomas O. Sargentich, The Emphasis on the Presidency in U.S. Public Law:
An Essay Critiquing Presidential Administration, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 34 (2007).
104. See Seidenfeld, Why Agencies Act, supra note 31, at 270 (stating that “indi-
viduals who promote a policy are evaluated not on whether the policy turns out to
be wise but rather on whether the policy is adopted by the agency”).
105. See Wendy Wagner, When All Else Fails: Regulating Risky Products Through
Tort Litigation, 95 GEO. L.J. 693, 698–700 (2007) (describing reasons why agencies
may not be motivated to monitor risks created by products they regulate); cf.
Marjorie A. Silver, The Uses and Abuses of Informal Procedures in Federal Civil Rights
Enforcement, 55 GEO. WASH L. REV. 482, 574–75 (1987) (noting that the limited
resources of the EEOC and OCR, and their desire to eliminate backlogs, induce
these agencies to inadequately monitor resolved cases).
106. See Samuel Issacharoff, Group Litigation of Consumer Claims: Lessons from
the U.S. Experience, 34 TEX. INT’L L.J. 135, 141 (1999); Wagner, supra note 105, at
700–01.
107. See Robert J. MacCoun, Media Reporting of Jury Verdicts: Is the Tail (of the
Distribution) Wagging the Dog?, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 539, 551 (2006) (addressing both
strengths and weaknesses of this view).
108. See generally Timothy D. Lytton, Clergy Sexual Abuse Litigation: The Poli-
cymaking Role of Tort Law, 39 CONN. L. REV. 809 (2007) (addressing the media’s
effect on public discourse in relation to church sex abuse scandals).
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ing a product to a higher standard of care can increase accountabil-
ity of the tort system.
The decentralized nature of tort suits may also facilitate the
development of a public consensus about the appropriate standard
of care.  Under current law, a product’s safety is likely to be chal-
lenged in multiple suits rather than a single class action.109  This
allows repeated opportunities for development of relevant informa-
tion and consideration by independent juries of issues, such as cau-
sation of injury and the blameworthiness of marketing the product,
that inform the calculation of an optimal level of care.  If an agency
fails to generate accurate information or for some other reason gets
the standard of care wrong, and tort suits are not available, then the
standard will not get corrected unless the agency recognizes its er-
ror.  By contrast, if a single court misses some information and sets
the standard of care incorrectly, other cases are available to fill the
information gap and correct the balancing of a product’s costs and
benefits.  Thus, at least in theory, the tort system can facilitate a
continuing deliberative public discourse that may ultimately gener-
ate some accepted understanding of benefits and injuries that flow
from marketing the product, and some consensus about whether a
producer has failed to take appropriate care.110
Unfortunately, heightened media attention on tort suits for
large awards can also undermine the responsible setting of stan-
dards.  The media has an incentive to sensationalize injuries.  In
addition, a plaintiffs’ attorney in a product liability suit has an in-
centive to encourage this sensationalism because it creates a threat
to the defendant, independent of the merits of the suit that might
induce a settlement favorable to the plaintiffs.  It also creates pub-
licity for the attorney that might aid his career.  Thus, there are
strong incentives to create a distorted public portrayal of the effects
of the product.  Rather than deliberative public discourse, exagger-
ated media attention can erode trust in the information being
presented which in turn undermines deliberative decision-
making.111
109. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
110. Lytton, supra note 108, at 879.
111. See MacCoun, supra note 107, at 545–48, 551–62.
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III.
INSTITUTIONAL COMPARISON OF WHO SHOULD
DECIDE WHETHER REGULATION PREEMPTS
My analysis thus far indicates that both regulatory preemption
and availability of tort suits are potentially beneficial although each
can also have negative consequences.  Moreover, there is no set of
factors that can be specified a priori which might indicate whether
preemption or the availability of tort liability is likely to provide
greater net social benefits in the context of injury from a particular
product.  Hence, the more meaningful question is: Who should de-
cide for any given case whether preemption is warranted?  The in-
stitutions that potentially can make this decision include Congress,
agencies and courts.  The mechanism for determining whether a
particular suit is preempted follows from which institution has pri-
mary responsibility for the preemption determination.
A. Congress
Proponents of allocating to Congress primary responsibility for
determining when federal regulation will preempt state law con-
tend that preemption involves political choices and that Congress—
being more deliberative, transparent, and accountable than admin-
istrative agencies and courts—is best at making those choices.112
Elsewhere, Brian Galle and I have rebutted the orthodox assump-
tion that Congress is superior with respect to these attributes, and
concluded that agencies are better suited for deciding preemption
issues.113  With respect to preemption of tort law, other attributes of
Congress, courts and agencies reinforce that conclusion.
The complexity and particularity of the determinations that
bear on the efficacy of preemption are beyond that to which Con-
gress can pragmatically attend, especially on a regular basis.114
When Congress enacts a regulatory statute, it sometimes includes
an explicit preemption or saving clause, but such clauses often ap-
112. See Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L.
REV. 2071, 2111–15 (1990).
113. Galle & Seidenfeld, Administrative Law’s Federalism, supra note 70.
114. See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Chevron’s Mistake, 58 DUKE L.J. 549, 567
(2009); David Epstein & Sharyn O’Halloran, Administrative Procedures, Information,
and Agency Discretion, 38 AM. J. POL. SCI. 697, 699 (1994).  The limits on Congress’s
ability to attend to the necessary details of regulatory programs has long been a
pragmatic justification for allowing Congress broad authority to delegate law-mak-
ing functions to agencies. See Andrew J. Ziaja, Hot Oil and Hot Air: The Development
of the Nondelegation Doctrine Through the New Deal, a History, 1813–1944, 35 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 921, 940 (2008).
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ply to the entire regulatory scheme or, at best, to broad provisions
within the scheme.115  These clauses do not include guidance about
preemption that takes into account the conduct that plaintiffs al-
lege to be tortuous in a particular case.116  For example, a new an-
tibiotic to treat drug-resistant bacteria might promise enormous
benefits by significantly reducing the risk of contagion.  These ben-
efits inure to the public, not just the purchasers of the antibiotic, so
the price of the drug does not reflect its marginal social benefit.  At
the same time, because such a drug may be rushed to market, it
might pose a foreseeable and significant, albeit uncertain, risk of
harm when approved.  For such a product, preemption to en-
courage its development and production would appear war-
ranted.117  For other drugs subject to the same approval regime,
such as a new painkiller that provides moderate benefits to a small
percentage of potential users but poses uncertain but potentially
significant risks, preemption would be much more difficult to jus-
tify.  Different products subject to a particular statutory provision
may also raise different questions regarding either the benefits of
non-uniformity that state tort systems might impose or the different
levels of uncertainty for the risk of future harm.  For example, the
ability of automobiles to protect passengers in front-end collisions
would seem to affect residents of different states similarly while the
design of automobiles to increase traction on icy roads would be of
more value in northern states than in southern ones.  Preemption
would be easier to justify with respect to the first safety concern
than the second.  To be fair, on occasion, Congress has responded
to an impending threat to the public health or safety by providing
guidance about potential tort liability for products developed to al-
leviate the threat.118  But in general, Congress lacks the time and
115. See e.g., Sharkey, Products Liability Preemption, supra note 3, at 461–62 (dis-
cussing the explicit preemption and savings clauses in the Motor Vehicle Safety Act
of 1966).
116. See Sharkey, Federalism Accountability, supra note 2, at 2148 (saying Con-
gress generally addresses preemption with “all-or-nothing” statutory provisions).
117. Such a drug would provide a public good, and therefore will be under-
produced by the market unless subsidized by the government. MARK SEIDENFELD,
MICROECONOMIC PREDICATES TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 65–66 (1996).
118. For example, in response to a pharmaceutical company’s unwillingness
to produce vaccines against childhood diseases because of liability concerns, Con-
gress enacted the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-660,
100 Stat. 3756 (codified as amended 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-1 to -34 (2006)).  The goal
of the Act was “to provide an expeditious method of compensating children who
are injured because of vaccines and to make liability for vaccine manufacturers
more predictable so that the supply of vaccines in the United States will be ade-
quate.”  Victor E. Schwartz & Liberty Mahshigian, National Childhood Vaccine Injury
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incentive to focus on the differences in products at a level of detail
that is needed to optimize the use of the tort system as a regulatory
backdrop.
The breadth of matters Congress considers, coupled with the
inertia built into the legislative process, decreases the attractiveness
of Congress as the primary institution to set the bounds of regula-
tory preemption.  These attributes preclude Congress from acting
other than episodically,119 thus impeding its ability to react to new
information about the need for tort liability.  For many products,
however, safety information bearing on the value of allowing tort
suits is only developed or revealed after the product has reached
the market.120  If one had to wait for Congress to amend a regula-
tory statute to take such new information into account, the country
likely would be stuck with Congress’s initial determination regard-
ing preemption, which could be far from efficient.  In addition,
post-marketing information can change the public’s attitude about
a particular product or the workings of an entire regulatory
scheme.  For example, the public’s trust in both the medical profes-
sion—whose responsibilities include prescribing the most benefi-
cial drugs on the market—and FDA regulators—whose job it is to
keep drugs that are not safe and effective off the market—has de-
clined markedly between the 1960s and 1990s.121  Yet Congress has
not reacted by significantly amending preemption provisions that
govern either medical devices or FDA approval of drugs.122
Act of 1986: An Ad Hoc Remedy or a Window for the Future?, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 387, 394
(1987).
119. See Galle & Seidenfeld, Administrative Law’s Federalism, supra note 70, at
1980.
120. See Lyndon, supra note 100, at 148–50.
121. See Jonathan Todres, Toward Healing and Restoration for All: Reframing
Medical Malpractice Reform, 39 CONN. L. REV. 667, 689 (2006); cf. Oliver Quick, Out-
ing Medical Errors: Questions of Trust and Responsibility, 14 MED. L. REV. 22, 37–38
(2006) (characterizing changes in trust of the doctors as moving from “uncondi-
tional to conditional trust”).
122. With respect to medical devices, the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
(FDCA) includes both a clause seeming to permit state suits for liability despite
compliance with an order approving a device, see 21 U.S.C. § 360h(d), and a clause
preempting state health or effectiveness based requirements different from those
imposed by the FDA, see id. § 360k.  According to the United States Code Anno-
tated, neither clause has been substantively amended since it was enacted as part of
the Medical Device Act in 1976.  With respect to approved drugs, the United States
Code Annotated indicates that The FDCA has never contained any clause giving
guidance on state law preemption or the availability of state tort suits for injuries
caused by such drugs. See Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 327 (2008) (not-
ing that Congress could have, but did not, apply the preemption clause of the
Medical Device Act to the entire FDCA).
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My conclusion that in most instances Congress will not be well
suited to determining whether a regulatory scheme should preempt
tort law in the context of a particular case does not mean that Con-
gress should never provide for preemption or, alternatively, for sav-
ings clauses allowing tort suits.  Congress plays an important role in
constraining agency action when the agency might otherwise pur-
sue idiosyncratic preferences that deviate significantly from those of
the polity generally.123  In those instances, Congress can use the
myriad means it has to influence the agency to “do the right
thing.”124  Ultimately, it may be necessary for Congress to override
the agency by passing a statute explicitly mandating or prohibiting
preemption.  But my conclusion does imply that statutory preemp-
tion or savings clauses should be used sparingly by Congress—per-
haps only when Congress believes that there are unusual
circumstances indicating that the regulators cannot be trusted to
decide the preemption issue to best serve the overall national inter-
est.125  Congress’s relatively weak competence to evaluate the wis-
dom of preemption in particular circumstances also suggests that
courts should not read legislative intent to deny agency authority
with respect to preemption of state tort law from anything less than
clear statutory language.
B. Agencies
1. Agencies’ Superior Institutional Capacity to Evaluate the Need
for the Availability of Tort Suits
The decision whether a particular regulatory action should
preempt tort suits hinges on balancing the benefits of allowing tort
suits against the detrimental impact such suits threaten.  Agencies
are uniquely suited among government institutions to perform
such balancing.  They develop knowledge about the cost structure
and likely impact of potential liability on the industries that they
123. See Mark Seidenfeld, Bending The Rules: Flexible Regulation and Constraints
on Agency Discretion, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 429, 481 (1999).
124. See Jacob E. Gersen & Eric A. Posner, Soft Law: Lessons from Congressional
Practice, 61 STAN. L. REV. 573, 606 (2008) (“Congress uses a range of instruments to
influence administrative agencies, including restrictions on the appointment and
removal of personnel, specification of substantive or procedural restrictions, ap-
propriations, oversight hearings, and deadlines.”).
125. Such circumstances might result from an agency abdicating its regula-
tory responsibility, such as occurred in the EPA under President Reagan. See David
W. Case, The EPA’s Environmental Stewardship Initiative: Attempting to Revitalize a
Floundering Regulatory Reform Agenda, 50 EMORY L.J. 1, 22–23 (2001) (describing
“the political embarrassment of mismanagement and scandal at the EPA under the
watch of Reagan’s first EPA administrator, Anne Gorsuch”).
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regulate.126  Agencies that monitor product safety and approve
products for market also often have the power to require producers
to disclose potential injuries threatened by their products,127 and
may have independent knowledge about the likelihood of such in-
juries.  Most significantly, during a rulemaking or approval process,
an agency will directly face the uncertainties in the information
available and will have to estimate the likely importance of such
information in predicting product safety.  Deliberating about the
value of known information may provide the agency with some idea
of the extent and importance of missing information, as well as
whether experience with the product after it is marketed is likely to
provide such information.
Preemption determinations may also involve a value judgment
about whether and how to compensate those injured by a product.
As noted above, agency rulemaking may be superior to the legisla-
tive process even with respect to deliberation, transparency and ac-
countability.  Agencies are subject to oversight by Congress and the
President.128  Simultaneously, unlike the legislature, agencies are
not subject to vetogates or pragmatically limited to episodic behav-
ior.129  Moreover, unlike courts, agencies can be proactive and de-
cide issues not yet presented by a dispute between particular
parties.  As such, agencies seem to be well suited to decide whether
tort suits should be preempted.
126. Cf. Simonetti Samuels, Interpreting Health Care Cost Containment Legisla-
tion: Good Samaritan Hospital v. Shalala and Relative Institutional Competence, 4 SUP.
CT. ECON. REV. 141, 142 (1995) (reporting how the Department of Health and
Human Services developed knowledge of the health care industry as it gained ex-
perience setting limits on payments to Medicare providers).
127. Although agencies generally have such power, they may not have suffi-
cient motivation to gather all the information they need to set an optimal stan-
dard. See Wagner, supra note 105, at 698–700 (describing reasons why agencies
may fail to demand sufficient information on product risks from industry).
128. See generally Sidney A. Shapiro, Political Oversight and the Deterioration of
Regulatory Policy, 46 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 1 (1994) (describing how Congress and the
President compete to control agencies).
129. Vetogates are structural requirements in the legislative process that can
prevent legislation from being passed even if it is popularly supported.  They in-
clude the constitutional requirements of bicameralism and presentment, and con-
gressionally adopted structures such as the committee system, which gives
committee chairs significant power to kill legislation, and the filibuster in the Sen-
ate. See Galle & Seidenfeld, Administrative Law’s Federalism, supra note 70 at 1962.
The episodic behavior of Congress refers to the inertia that plagues the legislative
process and the resulting phenomenon that Congress does not regularly update
statutes to reflect new information or political preferences. See id. at 1967.  Agen-
cies’ procedures for adopting regulations are more flexible, allowing them to
amend regulations on a more regular basis. Id. at 1983.
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2. Imperfections in the Administrative Process
The institutional superiority of agencies suggests that they
should play a more central role in determining when their actions
preempt tort law.  But the administrative state suffers from its own
imperfections.  Most notably, an agency may act to further its own
interests, which may deviate from those of the polity as a whole or
from the balance of goals that Congress might have meant the
agency to implement when it authorized agency action.130
Folklore about the administrative state has led to the belief
that agencies are motivated to maximize their power, measured ei-
ther by their budget131 or the reach of their jurisdiction.132  Studies
of agency motivation, however, demonstrate that this concept is not
particularly coherent.133  Agencies regulate through actions of their
staff members and ultimately their agency head.  Rarely is either
interested in simply maximizing the agency budget or
jurisdiction.134
Agency staff members tend to see their role as performing the
prescribed functions of their jobs which they view as allowing the
130. See Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic
State, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1511, 1570–74 (1992) [hereinafter Seidenfeld, A Civic Re-
publican Justification] (describing the potential for agencies to pursue idiosyncratic
values).
131. WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, JR., BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERN-
MENT 114 (1971) (arguing that “the coterminous relation of a bureaucrat’s rewards
and his position implies that a bureaucrat will maximize the total budget of his
bureau”).
132. See Jonathan R. Macey, Positive Political Theory and Federal Usurpation of the
Regulation of Corporate Governance: The Coming Preemption of the Martin Act, 80 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 951, 956 (2005) (positing that agencies care about their budget and
jurisdictional turf); Mendelson, supra note 3, at 794–95 (asserting that agencies
have incentives to maximize their jurisdiction to increase their ability to work out
deals with interest groups).
133. Thus, one recent study undermined the notion that the agency can act
with a single motivation because agency managers cannot easily get staff members
to follow their bidding. JOHN BREHM & SCOTT GATES, WORKING, SHIRKING, AND
SABOTAGE: BUREAUCRATIC RESPONSE TO A DEMOCRATIC PUBLIC 79, 101–08 (2000).
134. See Jacob E. Gersen, Overlapping and Underlapping Jurisdiction in Adminis-
trative Law, 2006 SUP. CT. REV. 201, 235 (labeling assumptions that agencies seek to
maximize their jurisdictions as “unproven background assumptions”); Daryl J. Lev-
inson, Empire-Building Government in Constitutional Law, 118 HARV. L. REV. 915, 932
(2005) (noting that “the relationship between a larger agency budget and higher
salaries or cushier working conditions is empirically tenuous”); see also Seidenfeld,
Why Agencies Act, supra note 31, at 268–86 (2009) (describing motives for action by
agency staff and agency heads).
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agency to achieve its mission.135  Staff members, however, may har-
bor an idiosyncratic understanding of that mission.  Agency staff
members may be zealots for the stated regulatory protections of the
programs within which they work.136  If so, they may view tort suits
favorably as a means of encouraging implementation of the agency
mission regardless of the cost suits imposed on regulated entities.
Some staff members, however, may see potential tort liability as go-
ing farther than the balance they deem appropriate between public
protection and encouragement of beneficial production by the in-
dustry the agency regulates.  These members would be predisposed
to advocate preemption of tort claims stemming from products they
regulate.
The motivation of an agency head will depend on his career
goals.137  The heads of regulatory agencies tend to come from polit-
ical or professional backgrounds, rather than a career within the
agency.138  They also tend not to be interested simply in maximiz-
ing agency budgets, especially because their tenure is short and
their ultimate future lies outside of their agency.  Like staff, they
too seek credit for getting things done at the agency.  Agency
heads, however, may be appointed because of their relationship
with the current administration and their future careers may de-
pend on the political support of those in the White House when
their tenure ends.139  Hence, they may be prone to an agenda that
135. See BREHM & GATES, supra note 133, at 79 (reporting that the two most
popular aspects of public bureaucrats jobs were “a feeling of accomplishment,”
and “chances. . .to accomplish something worthwhile”); cf. MARISSA MARTINO
GOLDEN, WHAT MOTIVATES BUREAUCRATS: POLITICS AND ADMINISTRATION DURING
THE REAGAN YEARS 155–56 (2000) (reporting that upper level career civil servants
are guided by “role perception” to provide analyses and information to allow their
superiors to set agency policy).
136. That “single mission agencies” may have “dedicated but zealous” staff,
which needs to be checked by political oversight outside the agency is a commonly
cited excerpt from an administrative law opinion.  Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d
298, 406 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
137. For an extended discussion of the motivations of agency staff members
and heads, see Seidenfeld, Why Agencies Act, supra note 31, at 267–86.
138. Id., at 282, n.101; see also JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERN-
MENT AGENCIES DO AND WHY THEY DO IT 200–01 (1989) (careerist as opposed to
political agency heads generally run agencies presented with the same sorts of de-
cisions every day and not with policy choices).
139. See Seidenfeld, Why Agencies Act, supra note 31, at 282; see also id. at
284–84 (explaining that political agency heads may be loyal to their administration
for social reasons as well).
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the White House sees as politically expedient, which may deviate
from what is best for the country.140
As opposed to maximizing budgets or jurisdiction, it is more
likely that both agency staff and heads prefer autonomy.141  Auton-
omy is created by an agency having a unique mission and therefore
not having to compete with rivals to ensure its continued existence.
Whether one is fanatical about protecting the putative beneficiaries
of regulation or hell- bent on freeing industry from regulatory con-
straints, achievement of one’s goals is easier without competition
for resources and support of a constituency.  It is possible that those
in agencies may see tort suits as interfering with agency autonomy
to the extent that the tort system is a regulatory rival that can in-
crease the work load on an agency.  This could occur if tort suits
forced the agency to reconsider a prior regulatory decision when it
is anxious to address the next problem or product.
Another concern raised by critics is capture of the agency by
the regulated industry.142  Capture is not a precisely defined con-
cept.143  In the broadest sense it occurs when an agency acts on
behalf of the entities it regulates rather than in the public inter-
est.144  But, the public interest usually requires a balance between
zealous regulation and industry flexibility that permits production
of beneficial goods and services at the lowest cost.  Hence, it is not
easy to determine when any agency decision reflects capture rather
than a proper balance, especially when viewed by a group repre-
senting those potentially injured by a product.  Moreover, an
agency’s political overseers may strike their own balance in favor of
regulation.  If the President and Congress favor a pro-industry out-
come of a regulatory matter, an agency that implements their pref-
140. See John McKay, Train Wreck at the Justice Department: An Eyewitness Ac-
count, 31 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 265, 283–84 (2008) (describing Attorney General
Gonzales’ problematic and perhaps unlawful firing of United States Attorney
David Iglesius seemingly to support the administration’s political preferences);
David Scheffer, For Love of Country and International Criminal Law, Further Reflections,
24 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 665, 667–68 (2009) (describing how Justice Department
lawyers who wrote memos justifying torture “did exactly what was required of them
to fulfill the expedient objectives of their political masters”).
141. See WILSON, supra note 138, at 180–82, 188–92 (1989).
142. See generally Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts: 1967–1984,
72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1039 (1997) (describing the history of capture theory and its
influence on judicial doctrines of administrative law).
143. See id. at 1059–62 (describing several different understandings of agency
capture).
144. See Thomas W.  Merrill, Rethinking Article I, Section 1: From Nondelegation to
Exclusive Delegation, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2097, 2143–45 (describing capture as a
form of agency drift from the preferences of the polity).
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erence for a regulatory scheme can be characterized as responsive
to political influence rather than captured.145
Nonetheless, regardless of whether through the influence of
Congress or the President, or through incentives the regulated in-
dustry provides to agency staff members, agencies can be induced
to further the interests of producers at the expense of the public.146
Therefore, were courts to grant an agency primary responsibility to
determine tort preemption, they would have to structure how the
agency makes that determination to minimize the potential for
capture.
3. Notice-and-Comment Procedures and Hard Look Review
as Cures for Agency Imperfections
The two threats of the administrative state just described—offi-
cials’ desire for autonomy to institute their conception of the regu-
latory scheme and industry capture—can be ameliorated to a great
extent by requiring agencies to use notice-and-comment rulemak-
ing to preempt tort law and by courts applying the exacting “hard
look” standard of review to such preemptive rules.147
However one defines capture, agency rulemaking is less likely
to reflect an inappropriate balance of interests than agency en-
forcement or permitting actions.148  Enforcement requires investi-
gation in a particular instance to see if conduct violates rules or
policies of the agency.  As such, it necessarily involves “street level”
officials who retain much discretion about whether to report a vio-
lation.149  Hence, a regulated entity can provide “benefits”150 to the
145. For example, the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) under Presi-
dent Reagan pursued a strong deregulatory agenda, which was the hallmark of
Reagan’s domestic policy against big government.  But ICC actions were not so
much a product of the agency being controlled by the trucking industry as it was
the agency implementing the agenda of a free market-oriented President and, to a
lesser extent, Congress. See Paul Stephen Dempsey, The Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion—Disintegration of an American Legal Institution, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 49 (1984)
(criticizing ICC deregulation of trucking and opining that “[t]he Commission has
lost the autonomy that traditionally shielded its decisionmaking from the political
winds that blow down Pennsylvania Avenue”).
146. Note, The Mysteries of the Congressional Review Act, 122 HARV. L. REV. 2162,
2178–79 (2009) (describing various posited mechanisms for agency capture and
asserting that capture in the broad sense of an agency acting against the public
interest does occur).
147. See infra notes 160–66 and accompanying text.
148. See Seidenfeld, Why Agencies Act, supra note 31, at 271–73 (2009).
149. See Keith Hawkins & John M. Thomas, The Enforcement Process in Regula-
tory Bureaucracies, in ENFORCING REGULATION 3, 9 (Keith Hawkins & John M.
Thomas, eds., 1984) (describing how discretion of meat packing plant inspectors
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official responsible for enforcement more easily and more secretly
than it can to those responsible for rulemaking.151  The susceptibil-
ity of licensing to capture, which under the APA includes such ac-
tions as FDA approval to market a drug,152 falls somewhere in
between that of enforcement and rulemaking.153  Ostensibly, ap-
proval is a matter between the agency and the entity seeking ap-
proval, and public participation in a particular product approval
may be limited by concerns for proprietary information and trade
secrets.154  Nonetheless, there may be some opportunity for public
participation in setting standards for product approvals.155  Public
interest groups, however, will be limited in the extent they can in-
troduce information into the record or challenge an agency deci-
sion to approve the marketing of a product.  In addition, issuance
led to a norm of inspectors accepting gratuities from the plants they inspected); id.
at 11 (stating that “field-level officials . . . have the power to commit the agency to
the investigation and prosecution of specific violations”).
150. Benefits may be promises of future jobs or outright bribes, but may also
be as simple as cooperating in providing information that allows an official expend
less effort and time to perform his job. See Seidenfeld, Why Agencies Act, supra note
31, at 271–74 (discussing capture of staff involved in the rulemaking process).
151. For a recent example of apparent capture in the enforcement context,
see Matthew L. Wald, Inspectors Say FAA Ignored Southwest Violations, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
4, 2008, at C3 (reporting that a manager in an FAA (Federal Aviation Administra-
tion) regional office had allowed Southwest to continue flying planes that had not
been inspected as required by FAA regulations).
152. The APA defines a “license” to include “the whole or part of an agency
permit, certificate, approval, registration, charter, membership, statutory exemp-
tion or other form of permission.”  5 U.S.C. § 551(8) (2006).  Licensing is “adjudi-
cation” under the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 551(6)–(7) (2006), and hence the public may
be limited in its ability to participate in the proceeding. See 5 U.S.C. § 555(b)
(2006) (specifying that, unlike a party, an interested person may appear before an
agency only “[s]o far as the orderly conduct of public business permits”).
153. As an example of what might be undue industry influence, the FDA has
been criticized for pressuring drug reviewers to approve new drugs even when they
had questions about the drugs’ safety or effectiveness.  Christine D. Galbraith, Dy-
ing To Know: A Demand For Genuine Public Access To Clinical Trial Results Data, 78
MISS. L.J. 705, 769–70 (2009).
154. See James T. O’Reilly, Knowledge Is Power: Legislative Control of Drug Industry
Trade Secrets, 54 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 8 (1985) (reporting that from 1967 through the
writing of the article, “the FDA uniformly has withheld, as confidential business
information or trade secrets, business data it has received in the course of drug
product approvals”).
155. See Lewis Rosman, Public Participation in International Pesticide Regulation:
When the Codex Commission Decides, Who Will Listen?, 12 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 329, 355
(1993) (describing opportunities for participation and judicial challenges to EPA
approval of pesticides).
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of approvals may involve a single office in an agency,156 which in
turn may discourage deliberation between staff members with dif-
ferent professional backgrounds.  Rulemaking, in contrast, allows
all those with an interest in a rule to provide input into the ultimate
decision in a transparent forum.  Development and adoption of
rules usually involves a team of agency officials from several offices
within the agency.157  It would be extremely difficult for an industry
to provide incentives for all team members to unjustifiably support
the industry’s preferences.158  If capture happens, it often occurs
when the industry convinces Congress and the White House—the
political overseers of the agency—to demand a pro-industry
outcome.159
The potential for an agency inappropriately to preempt tort
law can be ameliorated by requiring agencies to proceed by notice-
and-comment rulemaking subject to hard look review.160  Rulemak-
ing proceedings inform interest groups of the agency’s plans before
it formulates a final rule and allows these groups to alert Congress if
they believe the proceedings are contrary to their interests.  Use of
rulemaking subject to exacting judicial review encourages the
agency to collect input from its staff, usually comprised of individu-
als with varied professional backgrounds and different private con-
156. For example, at the FDA, new drugs are approved by “drug reviewers” in
the agency’s Center for Drug Evaluation and Research.  Galbraith, supra note 153,
at 769.
157. Mark Seidenfeld, Cognitive Loafing, Social Conformity, and Judicial Review of
Agency Rulemaking, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 486, 527–28 (2002) [hereinafter
Seidenfeld, Cognitive Loafing]; Thomas O. McGarity, The Internal Structure of EPA
Rulemaking, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 57, 90 (1991).
158. The evidence that agencies as a body are improperly influenced by spe-
cial interest groups is slim. See PAUL J. QUIRK, INDUSTRY INFLUENCE IN FEDERAL
REGULATORY AGENCIES 4–21 (1981); Steven P. Croley, Theories of Regulation: Incorpo-
rating the Administrative Process, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 52–56 (1998); Mark Kelman,
On Democracy-Bashing: A Skeptical Look at the Theoretical and “Empirical” Practice of the
Public Choice Movement, 74 VA. L. REV. 199, 238–68 (1988).
159. One example is the FCC giveaway of billions of dollars of electromag-
netic spectrum to existing television stations, which was essentially mandated by
Congress. See Thomas W. Hazlett, Physical Scarcity, Rent Seeking, and The First Amend-
ment, 97 COLUM. L REV. 905, 938–42 (1997) (describing how broadcasters influ-
enced Congress to give away spectrum for HDTV licenses to existing television
stations). See generally Ellen P. Goodman, Digital Televisions and the Allure of Auc-
tions: The Birth and Stillbirth of DTV Legislation, 49 FED. COMM. L.J. 517 (1997) (giv-
ing a detailed account of congressional consideration of the auction of HDTV
spectrum).
160. Seidenfeld, Demystifying Deossification, supra note 72, at 490–92 (describ-
ing “hard look” review).
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tacts and constituents.161  Thus, interest groups can more effectively
influence agency deliberation while the agency is formulating a
proposed rule, rather than after a rule is proposed.  Once the
agency has formulated its position, it is less open to change.  None-
theless, even after an agency proposes a rule, interest groups can
place comments in the record which often include data that can
undermine the agency’s explanation if it is later forced to defend
its decision in court.  Hence, subject to standing limitations, an in-
terest group can use the data it submits to challenge an agency rule
as arbitrary and capricious.
Hard look judicial review also provides a check against unjusti-
fied political influence.  Courts require that agencies explain their
actions in terms of factors “relevant” to their actions.162  Generally,
such factors include those identified in the agency’s authorizing
statute,163 and other fairly universally accepted values, such as the
desire to avoid spending money unnecessarily.  Thus, even when
the political branches pressure an agency to preempt tort law, in at
least some situations, the agency will simply not have sufficient data
regarding the impact of future liability on a producer or its product
to convince a reviewing court that preemption is warranted.  Un-
doubtedly, mandated decision-making procedures and exacting ju-
dicial review on their own will not always prevent an agency from
acting contrary to perceptions of the nation’s interest.  If Congress
and the President support an agency’s particular course of action,
judicial review will not prevent the agency from ultimate implemen-
tation.164  But even when Congress and the President strongly sup-
port a course of action, the public may be more hesitant about
pursuing it, in which case procedures and review can slow the ad-
ministrative process enough for politics to catch up with the agency
161. Id. at 493–94.
162. Jessica Mantel, Procedural Safeguards For Agency Guidance: A Source Of Legiti-
macy For The Administrative State, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 343, 387 (2009); Thomas O.
McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385,
1442 (1992).
163. See Richard J. Pierce & Sidney A. Shapiro, Political and Judicial Review of
Agency Action, 59 TEX. L. REV. 1175, 1190–91 (1981) (noting that judges can pick
and choose which of scores or even hundreds of statutory factors were relevant).
164. See Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification, supra note 130, at 1547–48;
see also William S. Jordan, III, Ossification Revisited: Does Arbitrary and Capricious Re-
view Significantly Interfere With Agency Ability to Achieve Regulatory Goals Through Infor-
mal Rulemaking?, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 393, 440 (2000) (finding that in almost every
instance over a decade long period, agencies were able to reinstate the substance
of rules remanded by the D.C. Circuit as arbitrary and capricious when the agency
did not agree with the court’s conclusion about the rule).
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agenda.165  In some cases this can facilitate political mobilization of
less focused interest groups to protect the public interest.166
4. Agencies’ Potential Disdain for State Interests
in Maintaining Tort Suits
Thus far, I have presented arguments for why notice-and-com-
ment rulemaking along with hard look review can be expected to
alleviate some of the pathologies of granting agencies wide discre-
tion to set policy.  Some scholars, however, cite evidence of an ap-
parent trend among several agencies to support preemption
generally and an accompanying willingness to shortchange state in-
terests even in the rulemaking process.167  In particular, these
naysayers report that these agencies have virtually ignored their ob-
ligations under Executive Order 13,132168 to consult with state and
local government officials and prepare an analysis of significant im-
pacts on these governmental entities.169  In addition, scholars have
reported that in several instances, agencies have abused the notice-
and-comment process by sneaking preemption provisions into the
preamble to rules thereby avoiding the notice-and-comment pro-
cess altogether.170  In other instances, agencies did accept com-
ments on preemption, but entirely ignored them in their final
determination to preempt state tort law.171  I believe that these
scholars infer more about agency hostility to federalism than the
165. See Seidenfeld, Why Agencies Act, supra note 31, at 320 (describing how
judicial review of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration’s (NHTSA)
passive restraint rule allowed politics to catch up with the agency and derail its
aggressive safety standard program).
166. See Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast, Adminis-
trative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 243, 257–58
(1987) (arguing that rulemaking procedures give Congress and the President early
warning of agency moves potentially requiring oversight); Metzger, supra note 3, at
2087 (noting that “by forcing an agency to provide notice of actions it plans to
take, procedural requirements empower congressional oversight and thus rein-
force such political safeguards as Congress has to offer”).
167. See, e.g., Ronald K. Chen, State Incarceration of Federal Prisoners After Septem-
ber 11: Whose Jail is it Anyway?, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 1335, 1344–45 (2004); Thomas O.
McGarity, The Perils of Preemption, 44 TRIAL 20, 20–24 (2008); Mendelson, supra
note 3, at 783–86.
168. Exec. Order No. 13,132, 64 Fed. Reg. 43,257 (Aug. 10, 1999).
169. See Chen, supra note 167, at 1344–45; McGarity, infra note 174, at 24;
Mendelson, supra note 3, at 783–86; see also Sharkey, What Riegel Portends, supra
note 8, at 457 (taking the FDA to task for failing to prepare federalism impact
statements, but adopting a more nuanced position on agency preemption
generally).
170. See, e.g., Sharkey, Federalism Accountability, supra note 2, at 2131–34.
171. See, e.g., id. at 2137.
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evidence supports.  Rather than manifesting insensitivity to tort vic-
tims and federalism, recent agency decisions preempting tort suits
reflect shortcomings in institutional incentives to consider such
matters.  Moreover, were judges to view the choice of preemption
as a policy decision for which agencies have primary responsibility
by way of the rulemaking process, judicial review would realign
these institutional incentives so that administrative law would allevi-
ate the supposedly antagonistic attitude of agencies towards tort
suits.
To understand the significance of agency ignorance regarding
Executive Order 13,132,172 one must recognize that this Order is
one of many that purport to require consultation and analysis.173
From an agency’s perspective, these required analyses are
“paperwork,” rather than documents that inform their rulemaking
decisions.174  The requirement that agencies perform them is en-
forced by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB),175and is
not backed up by judicial review.176  From the White House’s per-
spective these executive orders provide mechanisms for the Presi-
dent to force agencies to consider issues that the President deems
important and generally to exert more influence on agency
rulemaking.177  Thus, that the Office of Information and Regula-
tory Affairs (OIRA)178 did not rigorously police agency preparation
of federalism impact analyses when the underlying rules were fa-
vored by the President says little about agency attitudes toward
federalism.
172. Exec. Order No. 13,132, 64 Fed. Reg. 43,255 (Aug. 10, 1999).
173. See Mark Seidenfeld, A Table of Requirements for Federal Administrative
Rulemaking, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 533, 536–37 (2000) (detailing all of the proce-
dures with which an agency had to comply, in 2000, to adopt a legislative rule).
174. See THOMAS O. MCGARITY, REINVENTING RATIONALITY: THE ROLE OF REGU-
LATORY ANALYSIS IN THE FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY 43 (1991) (opining that the EPA
did not devote much attention to an initial regulatory flexibility analysis in its lead
phase down rule because it regarded the analysis “merely as a paperwork hurdle”).
175. Exec. Order No. 13,132, 64 Fed. Reg. 43,258 (Aug. 10, 1999).
176. Id. at 43,259.
177. See Kagan, supra note 82, at 2288 (noting how President Clinton’s execu-
tive order on regulatory review was worded to expand his ability to control agency
rulemaking); Shapiro, supra note 128, at 8–10 (describing executive orders requir-
ing regulatory impact analyses as one means for the President to engage in an
oversight game with Congress).
178. OIRA is the group within OMB that is responsible for regulatory over-
sight. See Exec. Order. No. 12,866 § 6(b), 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993)
(directing OIRA to “provide meaningful guidance and oversight so that each
agency’s regulatory actions are consistent with applicable law, the President’s pri-
orities, and the principles set forth in this Executive order”).
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Even when analyses are required by statute, agencies tend to
avoid preparing meaningful statements, or even preparing state-
ments at all.  For example, the Regulatory Flexibility Act requires
an agency to determine whether a rule will have a “significant eco-
nomic impact on a substantial number of small entities,” and to
prepare a Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (RFA) if it will.179  The Act
originally precluded judicial review of its requirements,180 which
led to complaints of lagging compliance, including agency failures
to consult with small businesses about the effect of rules and fail-
ures to prepare RFAs when the impact would be significant.181
Congress has since amended the Act to allow judicial review of its
requirements,182 and to make regulatory flexibility analyses pre-
pared by agencies part of the rulemaking record.183  This seems to
have induced agencies to prepare RFAs, although it is not clear
whether judicial review has prompted more consistent considera-
tion of small business interests.  Agencies are apt to continue to
consider these analyses as “paperwork” unless courts consider the
impact on small businesses a relevant factor in assessing whether a
rule is arbitrary or capricious.
Given that Executive Order 13,132 is not judicially enforcea-
ble184 and that the George W. Bush administration strongly pushed
for preemption of state tort law, it is no surprise that agencies did
not comply with the Order prior to issuing their stealth preemption
statements.  As such, if that executive order is to empower states in
the regulatory process, at a minimum, Congress will have to make
its requirements judicially enforceable.  Such action, at least for
now, would be unwarranted because one can give agencies better
incentives to seriously consider state interests in allowing tort suits
while still allowing more flexibility in the preemption decision.
This can be done by requiring agencies to explicitly include their
preemption determinations in rules.  This, in turn, will trigger the
reasoned decision-making requirements of arbitrary and capricious
review under the APA.
179. 5 U.S.C. §§ 603, 604, 605(b) (2006).
180. Regulatory Flexibility Act, Pub. L. No. 96-354, § 3(a), 95 Stat. 1164,
1169–70 (1980).
181. See Jennifer McCoid, EPA Rulemaking under the Regulatory Flexibility Act:
The Need for Reform, 23 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 203, 204, 231 (1995) (noting agen-
cies’ propensity not to comply with the Act and suggesting judicial review as a
cure).
182. Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act (SBREFA), 5 U.S.C.
§ 611(a)(1) (2006).
183. Id. § 611(b).
184. Exec. Order No. 13,132, 64 Fed. Reg. 43,259 (Aug. 10, 1999).
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Abuse of the notice-and-comment process is somewhat more
troubling because a state tort system does not necessarily involve
any particular state regulatory office that can effectively represent a
state’s interests early in the rulemaking process.  By the time a rule
is proposed, an agency has usually invested significant time and ef-
fort in the matter and may remain wedded to the position it has
taken.  Therefore, the key for interest groups to influence a
rulemaking is for them to get involved in pre-NOPR rule develop-
ment, usually through interactions with agency staff members from
the same profession or with similar views of the regulatory
scheme.185  If the subject of a rulemaking happens to fall within the
ambit of a state regulatory office, staff members from that office will
be aware of the pre-NOPR developments in the federal agency as
state agency staff members will often have professional acquaint-
ances on the federal agency staff,186 and can get their viewpoints
heard early in the process.  Unfortunately, when the subject of pre-
emption is tort law, there may be no state office to play the role of
the informed and involved representative of the state’s interest.187
And although one might look to state attorneys general to re-
present state interests in the federal agency proceeding, these attor-
neys general do not have the focused mandate on particular
regulatory matters to generate either the incentive or the agency
contacts to keep abreast of rulemaking developments in the various
industries regulated at the federal level.
185. See CORNELIUS M. KERWIN, RULEMAKING: HOW GOVERNMENT AGENCIES
WRITE LAW AND MAKE POLICY 79–80 (3d ed. 2003) (describing the importance of
rule development before a rule is proposed); Scott R. Furlong, Interest Group Influ-
ence on Rule Making, 29 ADMIN. & SOC’Y 325, 334–35 (1997) (reporting that interest
groups believe that informal contacts prior to a rule being proposed is one of the
most effective ways to influence rulemaking).
186. See Mark Seidenfeld, The Psychology of Accountability and Political Review of
Agency Rules, 51 DUKE L.J. 1059, 1078 (2001) (stating that “[o]ne suspects that
agency staff also maintains contacts with representatives from affected interest
groups and tries to keep such groups sufficiently placated to dissuade them from
sounding the alarm to the [congressional] oversight committee”); James A. Thur-
ber, Dynamics of Policy Subsystems, in INTEREST GROUP POLITICS 319, 325–26 (Allan J.
Cigler & Burdett A. Loomis eds., 3d ed. 1991) (describing the role of participants
in “policy subsystems,” including interest groups, agencies, policy specialists, and
the media, among others); see also id. at 332 (noting that, even when policy subsys-
tems are competitive, they often involve repeat players who “try to keep final deci-
sions out of the view of the public”).
187. Cf. Sharkey, Federalism Accountability, supra note 2, at 2158–63 (discussing
the problem of who represents the state regulatory interests in tort preemption
questions); id. at 2160 (noting that few states have agencies focused on food and
drug safety that could represent state interests in tort preemption issues before the
FDA).
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Perhaps the best representative of state interests in maintain-
ing tort suits against firms in a federally regulated industry would be
trial lawyers who represent potential victims, as they have a signifi-
cant financial incentive in the continued availability of tort suits.
Trial lawyers who sue firms in a particular industry will be aware of
the developing federal regulations affecting that industry and are
likely to have contacts on the staff of the federal agency.  One might
object that private plaintiffs’ lawyers are not the state and cannot be
trusted to represent the states’ interests.  The extent to which this is
troubling may reflect one’s attitude toward federalism.  If one be-
lieves that preemption threatens “abstract federalism” interests—
state sovereignty interests that can keep the federal government in
check—then this objection has bite.188  But if one believes in feder-
alism for its instrumental potential—to create a system of govern-
ment that in a particular context leads to better substantive
outcomes—then it may be that those who have an interest in the
substantive outcome are better suited to represent state interests
before the federal agency than state officials.189
The final concern with my proposal to have agencies preempt
by legislative rule stems from the standing and ripeness restrictions
courts have imposed in suits directly challenging agency preemp-
tion.190  If courts do not allow those opposing preemption to seek
judicial review, then reliance on judicial review’s ability to force
agencies to deliberate about preemption rings hollow.  This con-
cern warrants more extended treatment than I can give it in this
188. See Galle & Seidenfeld, Administrative Law’s Federalism, supra note 70, at
1941–42, 1978–79 (distinguishing abstract from instrumental federalist interests
and explaining why they do not put much weight on abstract federalism interests).
189. The response of the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL)
to a proposed preemption provision in a NHTSA rulemaking is illustrative of the
problems of having state officials represent state interests in rulemakings address-
ing preemption of tort law.  NHTSA proposed a rule governing automobile roofs’
resistance to being crushed in rollover accidents.  Federal Motor Vehicle Safety
Standards; Roof Crush Resistance, 70 Fed. Reg. 49,223 (proposed August 23,
2005).  NCSL comments simply asserted that NHTSA was usurping state authority
to set tort standards and argued that NHTSA did not have authority to preempt
state law on its own.  Comment, Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Roof
Crush Resistance, Docket No. NHTSA 2005-21243 (filed Dec. 14, 2005).  The com-
ments did not address whether the NHTSA rule was justified by the need for uni-
formity, the uncertainty that the rule would reasonably protect against unforeseen
types of injury in case of rollovers, or any other factor that bears on the wisdom of
the preemption provision.
190. See Time Warner Entm’t Co. v. FCC, 56 F.3d 151, 194–96 (D.C. Cir.
1995) (holding that a statement of FCC regarding preemption of inconsistent law
not ripe for review because the FCC statement did not resolve whether a state
regulation would be preempted in any particular factual setting).
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Article, but let me suggest several reasons to believe that these is-
sues may not be insurmountable for my approach.
Most significantly, until recently, the issue of preemption was
treated as one of statutory interpretation, not agency policy.191  As
such, agency statements about preemption represented, at best, the
informed interpretations of the agency.  Such interpretations war-
rant some deference from courts but are not pronouncements with
independent force of law.192  To put this in more concrete terms,
under current preemption doctrine, when a victim of an injury
from a product sues in state court, there is no guaranty that that
court will find the suit preempted by the statute just because the
agency opined that it is.193  Under the proposed approach, an
agency could preempt only by issuing a legislative rule which by
definition has independent force of law.  Hence, a state court
would be obligated to follow the determination of the agency so
long as the case fell within the bounds of the preemption specified
in the agency rule.
This goes a long way toward curing any uncertainties regarding
standing and ripeness.  For instance, if the agency rule preempted
tort suits already filed in state court, any plaintiff in such a suit
would be directly and immediately affected by the rule and could
seek a direct review.  Conversely, if the rule only preempted suits
not yet filed, then plaintiffs who suffered injury and could show that
they were preparing to file a suit in state court would probably be
able to meet standing and ripeness requirements because they
could show that they were precluded by the rule from conduct in
which they would have engaged: filing the suit.  Finally, even if
plaintiffs could not directly seek review of a preemption rule, state
attorneys general would most likely would be able to do so.194  Espe-
191. See Nina A. Mendelson, A Presumption Against Agency Preemption, 102 NW.
U. L. REV. 695, 697–98 (2008) (noting that recently agencies have asserted the
authority to preempt state law without explicit statutory authority, which has
changed preemption analysis from one of statutory interpretation to one of
legitimacy).
192. See Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000) (denying
Chevron deference to agency interpretative rule); United States v. Mead Corp., 533
U.S. 218, 219 (2001) (stating that an interpretation gets Chevron deference only
when “Congress would expect the agency to be able to speak with the force of
law”).
193. Cf. NRDC v. EPA, 559 F.3d 561, 564–65 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (generally a
preamble to a rule is not ripe for review because it does not constitute binding
agency action).
194. The fact that state attorneys general may not be the best entities to re-
present states’ interests early in a federal rulemaking proceeding involving tort
preemption, cf. supra notes 116–18, 186-87 and accompanying text, does not imply
\\server05\productn\N\NYS\65-3\NYS309.txt unknown Seq: 45 18-MAR-10 13:52
2010] WHO DECIDES WHO DECIDES 655
cially in light of Massachusetts v. EPA’s “special solicitude” for al-
lowing states to sue federal regulators to protect the interests of
their citizens,195 it is difficult to argue that a state official responsi-
ble for the enforcement of state legal standards would not have an
interest in a rule that would prevent courts in her state from ad-
dressing the appropriate standard of care.
C. Courts
Courts can play several roles in tort preemption depending on
which institution is primarily responsible for deciding when pre-
emption is appropriate.  If one sees Congress as the primary body
responsible for preemption, the courts’ role essentially consists of
interpreting statutes to determine when they call for preemp-
tion.196  If instead one views the judiciary as the body best suited to
determine when tort preemption is warranted, courts would have to
evaluate whether a particular suit interferes with the object of fed-
eral regulation to an extent that it is counterproductive.197
Courts are not well suited, either theoretically or pragmatically,
to evaluate whether allowing tort suits will pose sufficient hurdles to
federal regulation to justify preemption.  Such an evaluation will
not follow from precedent, or some definitive legal text on which
that they would not be good representatives of the state’s interests to challenge a
preemption rule.  By the time the challenge occurs, the agency will have issued a
final rule.  At that point, the attorney general will be aware of the preemption rule
and the challenges raised before the agency about the propriety of preemption,
and the state will not be shortchanged because the attorney general will have en-
tered the fray late.
195. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 520 (2007).
196. Under this view, preemption can occur because of actual conflict be-
tween state and federal law—when conduct necessary to comply with state law
would violate federal law—and where a statute manifests intent to displace state
law within an area.  Displacement can occur either implicitly, for example when a
court determines that Congress intended a statute to occupy the entire regulatory
field, or explicitly, when the statutory text states that it preempts state law. See
Merrill, Preemption, supra note 3, at 730–32 (distinguishing preemption by “dis-
placement” from that by “trumping”).  Strictly speaking, tort law simply mandates
that a producer pay for the harm its product causes.  In theory, therefore, state tort
law that imposes liability for complying with federal regulations does not render
compliance with both state law and federal regulation impossible.  Pragmatically
however, tort law that imposed such liability could dissuade producers from con-
duct that the federal government has determined to be beneficial.
197. See Sharkey, What Riegel Portends, supra note 8, at 438.  Courts currently
do this under the rubric that state law is an obstacle to the objectives of a federal
regulatory scheme. See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941); see also Caleb
Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 228–29 & n.14 (2000) (describing obstacle
preemption as a version of conflict preemption and collecting case cites).
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the court can rely.  Instead, courts will have to make value judg-
ments of the kind better left to the politically accountable
branches.  Moreover, any judicial evaluation will not depend on
skills that judges hone, such as parsing statutes or evaluating evi-
dence to determine whether an event occurred or not.  Rather,
they will depend on understanding the significance of data about
costs to producers and benefits to society that might flow from al-
lowing tort suits.  Courts will have to resolve questions about how
well markets are likely to work to ensure that beneficial products
are not forced out and detrimental ones not allowed to succeed.
This in turn will depend on an evaluation of the value the public
places on avoiding risks both posed by the product and by its ab-
sence from the market.  It also requires an understanding of how
producers are likely to react to post-market uncertainty posed by
potential tort suits, how much remains unknown about future risks
from the product, and a host of other fairly complex questions that
fall into the realm of policy analysis.198  If one adopts my suggestion
that agencies be primarily responsible for preemption determina-
tions, one must reject both Congress and the courts as primary arbi-
ters of preemption.  That rejection, however, still leaves some
important roles for Congress and the courts.  Congress still retains
its role of agency oversight.  As with any other agency regulation,
Congress can statutorily override agency preemption if it can mus-
ter the political will to do so.
As for courts, federal courts will be responsible for direct re-
view of preemption rules.199  Aggressive review of an agency’s rea-
soning is an important constraint against the pathologies that
might otherwise afflict agency policy making and an important in-
centive to encourage more deliberative decision-making.200  Judi-
cial review can slow down politically driven decisions that reflect
fleeting public preferences or imperfections that cause the politi-
cally accountable branches to drift from goals that best serve the
198. I concede that courts may have an advantage with respect to one deter-
mination—the abstract value of maintaining a federal system.  But this value is not
likely to be of great significance given the current state of the world in which states
remain viable political competitors to the federal government, thereby providing
some potential protection against the threat of a future tyrannical federal govern-
ment.  Galle & Seidenfeld, Administrative Law’s Federalism, supra note 70, at
1971–72, 1978.
199. The APA provides for any person adversely affected by final agency ac-
tion to seek judicial review.  5 U.S.C. § 704 (2006).
200. Seidenfeld, Cognitive Loafing, supra note 157, at 512–22; see also Buzbee,
supra note 2, at 1576–77 (arguing that hard look review of agency preemption
decisions will foster transparency, accountability and deliberation).
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national polity.201  Judicial review is also crucial for encouraging
agencies to incorporate staff members with expertise in the tort sys-
tem into their preemption decision-making process.
Of particular significance, judicial review can force agencies to
confront not only whether to preempt, but also the bounds of that
preemption.  For example, cost advantages of uniformity, and the
potential perversities of having to comply with the strictest state
standard may justify preemption of torts based on defective product
design.  Presumably an agency would have to have additional rea-
sons, such as a market imperfection necessitating a subsidy for the
product, in order to justify a blanket preemption of torts relating to
the product.  Hence, in this example, review would encourage the
agency to allow torts based on faulty manufacturing.  More gener-
ally, judicial review will prompt agencies to limit preemption to pre-
cise situations where it would not eliminate a producer’s incentives
to continue improving the safety of their products and where elimi-
nation of tort suits would provide a demonstrable social benefit.
In addition, courts (or more broadly state tort systems) will
provide an avenue for continued deliberation about an agency pre-
emption decision.  Even after regulating, agencies retain authority
to continue monitoring and revising their rules.202  Post-regulatory
marketing and use may reveal the extent to which a product creates
a public benefit or poses a threat of injury and may allow a pro-
ducer to develop data about the costs of taking further care to avoid
injuries.  Although agencies can amend their preemption rules
more easily than Congress can amend statutes,203 agencies, unfortu-
nately, do not have much incentive to continue monitoring injuries
from a product once it has adopted a preemption rule.  Tort plain-
tiffs’ lawyers, however, do.  State courts thus can play a role in keep-
201. Seidenfeld, Why Agencies Act, supra note 31, at 320 (concluding that re-
versal of NHTSA’s passive restraint rule in 1972 allowed interested parties and the
public to organize to stop the agency from imposing this and other aggressive auto
safety regulations).
202. Agency authority to issue rules includes the authority to amend them
once issued.  5 U.S.C. § 551(5) (2006) (defining “rule making” to include the pro-
cess for amending a rule).  One impediment, however, to agency rule revision with
respect to particular products may be an absence of agency authority to require
manufacturers to provide data on the safety of products after they are approved.
See Peter Chang, Reauthorization of PDUFA: An Exercise in Post-Market Drug Safety Re-
form, 36 J.L. MED. & ETHCS 196, 196 (concluding that the latest iteration of the
Prescription Drug User Fee Act “augments a [previously] feeble post-marketing
drug safety regime”).
203. Recall that the ability to act on a more continuous basis was one of the
advantages of granting primacy on preemption to agencies rather than Congress.
See supra notes 119-22 and accompanying text.
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ing plaintiffs’ attorneys active in monitoring producers even after
an agency adopts a preemption rule.  The question is how the
plaintiffs’ bar can play that role if the agency has preempted tort
suits.  The answer is the flexibility state courts have in determining
the scope of preemption rules.
Because agencies will be discouraged from adopting blanket
preemption rules, a state court will have the opportunity to deter-
mine the bounds of preemption in many cases before it.  For exam-
ple, consider the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
(NHTSA) notice of proposed rulemaking on the ability of automo-
bile roofs to withstand rollover collisions, which includes the follow-
ing provision:
[T]he agency believes that either a broad State performance
requirement for greater levels of roof crush resistance or a nar-
rower requirement mandating that increased roof strength be
achieved by a particular specified means, would frustrate the
agency’s objectives by upsetting the balance between efforts to
increase roof strength and reduce rollover propensity. . . . [I]f
the proposal were adopted as a final rule, it would preempt all
conflicting State common law requirements, including rules of
tort law.204
Assume that NHTSA adopts the rule.  Suppose further that a
plaintiff injured in a rollover collision in which the roof fails to pro-
tect him discovers that the automobile he was driving was three
times more likely than the average car to rollover in a crash.  The
plaintiff then sues claiming that the car design was defective be-
cause of this tendency to rollover rather than any problem with the
roof.
Presumably, the defendant will move for dismissal, and the
trial court will have to decide whether this suit is preempted by
NHTSA’s rule.  The trial court could delay the determination of
preemption until discovery occurs, allowing the parties to develop
information relevant to whether the injury could be attributed to
something other than a faulty roof.  In this way, suits that might
generate information relevant to the agency’s preemption decision
will not be entirely barred by the preemption rule.205  Moreover,
204. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Roof Crush Resistance, 70 Fed.
Reg. 49,223, 49,245–46 (proposed Aug. 23, 2005).
205. Courts would have the best information if they could delay any preemp-
tion determination until after plaintiffs have discovered information the producer
has amassed about a product that has already gone to market.  There is a catch-22,
however, to a court waiting until after discovery to decide a preemption motion.
Allowing a case to proceed to the discovery phase will encourage producers to
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this information can be shared with the agency either informally in
communications with agency staff, or more formally by a petition
asking the agency to amend its preemption rule.206  Finally, if an
agency that has already adopted a preemption rule is truly unre-
sponsive to persuasive arguments that determinations should be re-
visited, those seeking to allow suits could go to Congress or the
White House to pressure the agency to reconsider its position.
CONCLUSION
In many contexts, there are benefits that derive from maintain-
ing state tort suits as a backup to federal regulation of nationally
marketed goods or services.  In other contexts, however, there are
benefits to prohibiting such tort actions.  Thus, the more interest-
ing question than whether regulation or torts are best at setting
standards of care is: Who should decide whether the standard
should be set by regulation or tort?  With respect to that question,
the institutional advantages of agencies suggests that they are best
suited to exercise primary responsibility to answer the question of
whether tort suits should be preempted in specific contexts.
In order for society to reap the rewards of agencies’ institu-
tional advantages, however, courts should require that agencies use
notice-and-comment rulemaking subject to hard look judicial re-
view when making preemption determinations.  Congress and the
state courts also retain roles in determining preemption.  Congress
remains an overseer of the agency and can reverse an agency re-
garding preemption.  State courts still have to decide particular tort
cases, and therefore must rule on the bounds of regulatory preemp-
tion.  Because state courts may have more recent and complete in-
formation about product risks than the agency did when it issued its
preemption rule, state judges should use their decisions about the
bounds of preemption to update agencies about such risks.
settle on terms that allow them to keep trade secrets or embarrassing information
secret.  This in turn could keep hidden the very information the court hoped to
obtain by delaying the preemption determination until after discovery. See MC-
GARITY & WAGNER, supra note 79.
206. 5 U.S.C. § 553(e) (2006).
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